Lindsey Graham and Joe Lieberman just got back from a trip to Georgia, and didn’t hesitate more than a few moments to drop the K-bomb in describing the crisis there:
Russia’s invasion of Georgia represents the most serious challenge to this political order since Slobodan Milosevic unleashed the demons of ethnic nationalism in the Balkans. What is happening in Georgia today, therefore, is not simply a territorial dispute. It is a struggle about whether a new dividing line is drawn across Europe: between nations that are free to determine their own destinies, and nations that are consigned to the Kremlin’s autocratic orbit.
We happen to think that things are infinitely more complex than Putin = Milosevic, and that all separatism issues can only be considered in their respective independent political contexts. Furthermore, one would be hard pressed to find a country more critical of the international recognition of Kosovo’s independence that the Georgian government itself, so I’m not quite sure what Graham and Lieberman are getting at. I think that this other article by J. Victor Marshall is much more convincing with regard to Moscow’s instrumentalization of the Kosovo precedent, as well as an illustration of Washington losing its moral high ground by “selectively turning principles into propagandist slogans for scoring points.”
As Richard Weitz at the Hudson Institute noted at the time, Russia could seize upon Kosovo as a precedent for fomenting separatist movements in the former Soviet republics, including South Ossetia’s drive for independence from Georgia in the Caucasus.
Jonathan Eyal, director of international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute, warned similarly, “if the Kosovo precedent is used, the Russians can also recognise ethnic Russian enclaves in places such as Georgia or Moldova. What’s good for Kosovo is good for other places as well.”Their unheeded warnings have just come to pass, at the expense of thousands of dead and wounded.Just as NATO justified its intervention in 1999 as a humanitarian defense of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians against Serbian atrocities, so Russia said it came to the defense of South Ossetia, which suffered terrible atrocities at Georgian hands in the early 1990s, after Georgian troops shelled its capital earlier this month.In addition to Kosovo, Russia can justify its intervention on behalf of South Ossetia by pointing to any number of other precedents set by the United States: the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemption, its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, its silence in the face of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, and many more.What difference do all these precedents and broken principles make?By selectively turning principles into propagandist slogans for scoring points, the United States no longer occupies the political high ground. Washington’s lectures sound like hectoring, not sincere admonitions that could sway international public opinion and restrain Russian actions.In short, by squandering its moral authority, the United States has unilaterally disarmed itself of “soft power” that was once one of our greatest weapons. And Kosovo was one of the fields upon which the United States laid down its moral arms.
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http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/28ap21.htmSerbia has no legitimate claim to KosovaBranka MagašA. Kosova’s prerogatives under the former Yugoslav constitution fully replicated those of the six republics1. Kosova had its own territorial identity, its own capital city, its own government responsible to its own assembly, its own constitution and constitutional court, and its own system of justice.2. It had complete control over its internal affairs, including possession of its own police and state-security service as well as its own Territorial Defence forces.3. It was a member of the Federation on a par with the other republics and its representative was an equal member of the Yugoslav state presidency (ie Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics AND two provinces).4. Its full autonomy within the Yugoslav Federation was reflected also in the fact that no intervention in its internal affairs, by either Serbia or the Federal state, could legally take place without its permission. Equally, no change of its borders or its status within the Federation could be made without its (freely expressed) will.B. Difference between Kosova and the republics in former Yugoslavia1. The only difference between Kosova and the republics was that Kosova was formally not a republic but “only” a province. Not being a republic meant that it had no right to secede from Yugoslavia (ie join Albania). It consequently had to be included in one of the republics: in 1945, after some hesitation, it was placed within the republic of Serbia. As a result of this inclusion Serbia was constituted as a complex rather than a centralised republic, differing in this regard from the other five.2. Kosova’s integration into Serbia amounted to its delegates taking part in the workings of the Serbian republican assembly and the Serbian republican Communist party organisation; but this participation was limited to issues affecting the republic as a whole and did not include matters of concern purely to Serbia Proper (ie the territory of the republic of Serbia minus the territories of Kosova and Vojvodina), so that Serbia Proper functioned as a separate unit from Kosova and Vojvodina.C. Briefly on the history of the Kosova-Serbia-Yugoslavia relationship1. Kosova came under Serbian rule in 1912 not by the free will of its people, but as a result of conquest subsequently sanctioned by the European Powers. (This was true also of Macedonia.) Soon after, in 1915, Serbia itself became a conquered land. Although in 1918 Serbia re-established physical control over Kosova (and Macedonia), its own separate existence was brief as it soon became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The first (Royalist) Yugoslavia fell apart in 1941 and was in 1945 replaced by Federal Yugoslavia.2. Yugoslavia as constituted in 1945—ie as specified by its own constitution—derived its legitimacy not from Royalist Yugoslavia, but from the National Liberation War (NLW) through which it freed itself from foreign occupation. In this second Yugoslavia, which lasted until 1991, Kosova became an autonomous political entity. According to the Yugoslav constitution, moreover, Kosova’s autonomy was not a gift of Serbia or of Yugoslavia, but derived from its population’s participation in the NLW. Kosova’s relationship to Serbia was thereby radically altered, as it now had its own constitutionally defined political legitimacy resting upon popular consent.3. In 1989, however, Serbia under Milosevic forcibly stripped Kosova of its autonomy. This happened in the following way: Kosova was placed under a state of siege, and its assembly—meeting in emergency session—was ringed with tanks, while MiG jest flew over the building. Outside the building many thousands of Kosovars demonstrated against Serbia’s action. The Serbian authorities have since claimed that the assembly voted in favour of Kosova’s full integration with Serbia, but Kosova officials deny that the decision had the necessary majority.4. Kosova’s assembly, indeed, met in strength soon after and proclaimed Kosova a republic within Yugoslavia, or, in the event of the latter’s break-up (which was now on the horizon), an independent republic. This decision was subsequently validated by a popular referendum.D. It is important to note that:1. Serbia’s suspension of Kosova’s constitution (autonomy), executed without and against the legally articulated will of the people of Kosova, was an illegal act, contrary to the existing Serbian, Kosovar and Yugoslav constitutions. It was ipso facto an act of annexation.2. The Yugoslav federal authorities, in so far as they actively aided or passively permitted this annexation were also in breach of the Yugoslav constitution.3. Kosova’s altered status within Serbia (specified by the 1990 Serbian constitution) was never constitutionally validated by an act of the Yugoslav Federation, ie it never entered into the Yugoslav Federal constitution.4. Such alteration of the Yugoslav constitution became in any case impossible, since with the closure of the Kosova assembly by the Serbian authorities all Federal bodies (the two Federal assemblies, the Federal government and the Federal presidency) lost the power to enact laws.5. The Yugoslav Federal constitution, and Kosova’s autonomous prerogatives, consequently remained in force until Yugoslavia’s formal break-up in 1991.6. Kosova’s present status is not regulated by the constitution of the Serbian-Montenegrin federation (“FRY”) either, since that constitution does not yet exist as an integral and consistent body of primary laws valid for the whole of “FRY”. The Serbian constitution, indeed, differs substantially from that of Montenegro and from the (as yet nominal) constitution of “FRY”. For example, the Serbian constitution gives the Serbian president exclusive command of the Serbian armed forces, while according to the “FRY” constitution the “FRY” (hence also Serbian) armed forces are under the supreme command of the “Federal” president assisted by the presidents of Serbia and Montenegro.E. Kosova’s claim to independence has the same legal validity as that of the former republics1. Serbia’s suspension of Kosova’s autonomy was not legalised by the former Yugoslavia, nor could it have been, given that this would have required Kosova’s free agreement which was never given. Although Yugoslavia has disappeared, its constitution still nevertheless defines the legal status quo ante.2. This means that Serbia’s claim to Kosova remains to be legally established. This claim cannot refer to the initial act of conquest (since that was invalidated by the former Yugoslav state), nor to Serbia’s 1990 constitution (which lacks all legal validity).3. By contrast, Kosova’s claim to independence from Serbia is far stronger, since:(a) it came in reaction to an illegal act of annexation;(b) the independence decision was taken by the (within Yugoslavia’s constitutional terms still in force at the time) legally elected assembly;(c) this decision was subsequently validated by a popular referendum. Kosova’s claim to independence, in other words, rests on the same foundations as those of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia—all of which have been recognised as independent states and Yugoslavia’s legal successors.
http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dc2m8p62_288g8bt7bf2http://www.rferl.org/content/The_Real_Balkan_Lessons_In_Georgia_Conflict/1192597.htmlCommentary & AnalysisThe Real Balkan Lessons In The Georgia ConflictBy Gordana Knežević, Radio Free Europe, August 20, 2008Russian nationalists in April:”Kosovo is Serbia”This was supposed to be a dull August with the Olympics in Beijing dominating news around the world, Iraq on autopilot, and most Europeans away on vacation.Then the Russians surprised everyone [NOT everyone] by moving tanks and armored personnel carriers across the Georgian border.War is not like an earthquake or other natural disaster. It never just “breaks out,” as the expression goes. Spontaneity is usually only apparent. It is invariably a premeditated operation planned well in advance. Modern war demands a lot of logistical preparation.The Russians, it would seem, also spent time preparing for the intellectual and informational side of the current conflict. Russian officials repeatedly cited the example of Kosovo as a “precedent” for their action, arguing that if Kosovo can become an independent state, then why not South Ossetia and Abkhazia? [Maybe because they don't really want them to be independent]Even Russia’s longtime ally Serbia must have been thrown for a loop by the comparison. Moscow argued for years against Kosovar independence. Moscow’s threat to use its veto in the UN Security Council has the fledgling Kosovar state struggling for recognition. And now it is suddenly siding with separatists in Georgia. The Kremlin wants to have its cake in the Balkans, and eat it in the Caucasus [and the money that paid for it in Chechnya].If the government in Belgrade wanted to draw analogies from the current crisis, surely they would want to be identified with Georgia, whose territorial integrity is taking a severe beating. But any support for Tbilisi from Belgrade wouldn’t go down well in Moscow, and Serbia no doubt prefers hypocritical support to no support at all.This confusion is illustrated by two stories that have come out of Serbia in the last few days. First, dozens of Serbs lined up at the Russian Embassy to sign a condolence book for the victims of the fighting in South Ossetia and to show solidarity with Mother Russia.On the next day, however, the Russian Defense Ministry named Serbia as one of the countries that had supplied arms to Georgia before the fighting erupted.Clearly, Serbia is having trouble deciding with whom to identify.But there are similarities between the Balkan wars of the 1990s and the Caucasus today.Both conflicts were primarily about a state asserting itself as a regional power and trying to preserve control over parts of their former communist empires.Seen this way, Serbia is not like Georgia or South Ossetia, but rather a mini-Russia, sharing Moscow’s belief that it is the main regional power and the surrounding states — all fragments of a previous glory — must accept this fact and act accordingly. Big Brother will take care of everyone’s security and no one is to reach out to NATO or the EU.Actions, Not WordsThe Yugoslav Army tried to impose its own version of law and order when it sent tanks into Slovenia (briefly), and then on a larger scale into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moscow made a similar move when it sent its columns into Georgia on August 7-8.In both the Serbian and the Russian cases, military action was justified as a “humanitarian intervention” to protect one’s citizens and co-ethnics. I remember watching the day-by-day destruction of the Croatian city of Vukovar in 1991 and thinking that destroying homes and reducing a city to rubble was a strange way of protecting people.Now, having handed out passports freely to residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Russians too are protecting their citizens — by destroying whatever chance they had of living side-by-side with their Georgian neighbors in peace.I learned an important lesson about war reporting in 1992, when I was covering the conflict in Sarajevo: pay attention to actions, not words.In August 1992, I reported from a London peace conference on Bosnia. The Europeans and Americans took turns lecturing the Balkan warlords. “Europe will not tolerate ethnic cleansing or terror against civilians,” I heard more times than I could count. I didn’t miss a single press conference; I reported every detail of the statement of principles that was adopted. And then I returned home, taking a commercial flight to Zagreb, Croatia, and then catching a UN cargo plane to Sarajevo.And when I got home, I realized I had missed the real story.While I’d been away, half my city had been destroyed.Most of the building where my newspaper’s offices were located was gone.The National Library was burned out. Communications had been destroyed, and the Serbian military had tightened its grip on the city more than ever. And all that had happened while Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, and the rest had been listening to rants, giving promises to EU leaders, and signing the latest peace plan.It took the European community years just to figure out who lived in Bosnia and who was fighting whom in which part of the country. But that wasn’t the real point — we were all just people who happened to live in a postcommunist country that neighbored a “regional power,” Serbia, that decided it had enough might to impose its will on the region. Nationalism was not the cause of the wars in the Balkans — it was just a tool of Serbian aggression.Milošević spent years signing peace agreements with one hand while running bloody wars with the other. The Dayton peace accords ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, but it wasn’t until NATO finally intervened in 1999 that Milošević’s horrific war games in that country came to an end.Milošević cheated justice one last time when he died in custody at The Hague in 2006 before the tribunal was able to render a verdict in his case.Now there is a six-point plan for Georgia. European envoys are rushing around Moscow an the Caucasus. But I am skeptical and worried about the people on the ground. Europe couldn’t handle Milošević. How are they going to deal with Vladimir Putin?Gordana Knežević is the director of RFE/RL’s South Slavic and Albanian Languages Service. The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL