The author Simon Sebag Montefiore has a must-read op/ed in the New York Times about Russia’s lack of a mechanism to transfer power from one leader to the next.
Vladimir Putin wants his successes in Russia to be respected by the West; hence he did not simply ignore the Constitution and stay in the presidency. He and his grandees believe in the idiosyncratic style of authoritarian democracy that has restored Russian prestige (although his courtiers are also keen to preserve their power and wealth).(…)
If the Russians are happy with it, should their peculiar semi-modern, semi-medieval system concern us? A superb book called “Flawed Succession,” edited by Uri Ra’anan in 2006, examines four 20th-century Russian successions and suggests it does: “The absence of a transparent, consistently implemented, non-arbitrary transfer of power mechanism,” writes Professor Ra’anan, means that power is “transferred inevitably by coups, whether through covert opaque manipulations … or physical elimination.” Without such a mechanism, “a democracy cannot be established,” nor can rule of law or a civic society.
Clearly, this lack of civic society affects the way rulers rule. Russia is so feudal in its system of patronage and reward that it is virtually impossible for a leader to hand over power without controlling his successor or at least receiving an exemption from prosecution — something Mr. Putin granted his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, in 1999. Leaders, writes Professor Ra’anan, “are condemned to lead a Hobbesian existence, fearing the penalties that come with loss of power.”
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“Even under a regime dominated by former K.G.B. officials, Moscow is freer than at any time in its history, other than the mid-1990s. So it is astonishing that, while Russia has its own Vogue magazine and Internet cafes, its political process is now more arcane, more eccentric and yet more public than it was during the 18th-century ‘age of palace revolutions.’”That’s a remarkably stupid passage from the text, just what I’ve come to expect from the likes of the New York Times.Does this dolt really think that the existence of Internet cafes, which the vast majority of the population can’t afford and where bloggers are routinely persecuted and arrested, proves Russian freedom? Vogue magazine? What is this moron smoking?And then there’s the bigger point, of course, which is akin to pointing out the best ballerina in Boise. OK, but so what? Russia was 99% unfree in the past, and now it’s 97% unfree, and we’re supposed to take consolation in that? At no time in Russian history has it been ruled for so long by the secret police.Undoubtedly, when Stalin first took power, Russia was much more free than when he was several years into his ghoulish mass murder spree. But if Russians looked at that early period and said “this isn’t so bad” comparing it to the worst period of Tsarist rule, and in so doing declined to take action to stop Stalin, then they were complicit in mass murder.And where does he get the idea that Putin became PM out of respect for the West? Sounds like a crackpipe dream to me. How about if Putin simply saw the economic crisis coming and wanted a handy scapegoat? How about if he wanted to implement a new level of crackdown and not get blamed for it?That last thing we need is goofballs like this guy helping to rationlize what could well turn out to be the historical period that once again caused national collapse.
That’s probably not the best line in the whole article, but Simon Sebag Montefiore does write some interesting books, IMO. He’s also certainly making a good point about the ever-present transition problem in Russia, and that the only way a president can leave power is by first guaranteeing that they won’t be prosecuted for the crimes they committed while in power. (Putin proved his loyalty to Berezovsky and Yeltsin by protecting Sobchak and even creating some filthy kompromat against the guy out to get him).You think Putin saw the economic crisis coming? Really? That’s quite a compliment of intelligence?