The New York Times editorial board has stepped forth on Russia’s veto of the U.N. resolution extending UNOMIG’s presence in Abkhazia in an opinion entitled “Small Minds in the Kremlin”. I’m going to do my best here to strip out the polarizing language of the opinion and boil this down to what exactly Russia sacrificed, in the opinion of the Times, by sticking to its linguistic guns in the U.N. Security Council at the beginning of this week:
- Russia’s larger interest lies in calming, not stirring up, secessionist ambitions in the Caucasus, a violently fractured part of the world that includes other restive regions like Chechnya.
- Whatever hopes the Russian-backed separatists in Abkhazia might still retain for a semblance of international legitimacy vanishes with the withdrawal of the United Nations mission.
- Abkhazia secessionists will be hard pressed to calm concerns about the treatment of minority ethnic groups when they expel the only neutral monitors from their territory.
- The fact that only Russia and Nicaragua recognized the Abkhazia’s independence after last summer and that Russia voted alone on Monday further isolates it from the rest of the world on this issue.
I’m going to reiterate here that these are the Times’ views, I am merely the messenger. I am also the facilitator though, so here’s a question: considering that this resolution was only four months old and that one of the things the United Nations does best is punt on an issue, what if language had been drafted up that agreed to temporarily continue calling the mission the “United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia” for, say, another four months, at which point the Security Council would reconvene to agree on a better name for the mission? At the very least this would have bought everyone a little more time and it must have been considered at some point. But it was not to be. This leads to the next question: Assuming that it was Russia that prevented a punt, what does Russia gain by vetoing now rather than agreeing to punt? I have my own theories on this but am withholding them for now pending more developments.
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I think Russia is simply trying to push Abkhazia as an independent country, and reacting angry at the name “Georgia” in the document to show how much it cares about the correct labelling of the Abkhazian situation. Of course this sounds more than a bit exaggerated; but maybe they think that, if it ends well — i.e. with the world leaving Abkhazia to the Russians –, then all will be forgiven. (Which is not unlikely, by the way.) Also, there’s the internal, Russian public opinion to be taken into account: Russia must always come out strongly so as to keep its own “big power” image for internal consumption.One thing I keep asking myself, though, is whether or not Abkhazia and South Ossetia shouldn’t logically force Russia to change her mind about Kosovo. Since Kosovo was seen as a precedent that led to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, how can Russia now support the independence of the latter two states but not accept the independence of Kosovo? That wouldn’t be logical. (In all fairness, neither would it be logical for the rest of the world to accept Kosovo’s independence but not that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia — they do have some good reasons not to want to be a part of Georgia.) Doesn’t such lack of logics ultimately harm a country’s image, internally and/or externally?
One distinction is that Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo is recognized by the post-war UN resolution 1244, and the West’s recognition of Kosovo is in violation of that UN resolution.On the other hand, Georgia’s attack on S. Ossetia was itself a violation of a UN resolution, as was its attack on the Russian Army peacekeepers deployed there under a UN resolution, and Russia was fully within her self-defense rights to defend Russian Army personnel from that Georgian attack. Post-war, there has been no UN resolution recognizing Georgian sovereignty over S. Ossetia or Abkhadzia.
Note that Russia’s condemnation of the attack, though mentioning resolution 1244, was not conditional to it — i.e. Russia would have been against it anyway.And it is still not clear that Saakashvili was the first to attack South Ossetia, or that he did that without provocation (e.g. the drone flights) presumably to make him do something stupid. There are sufficiently many doubts to make the South Ossetia situation look doubtful.And anyway, this was South Ossetia. Russia was the one to link Abkhazia to that situation, sending troops there despite the fact that there had been no attack on that breakaway province.So we’re back to — how can Russia (or, in all fairness, the West) be against breaking a country’s territorial integrity in one case, but not in another? (Suggested answer: because of Realpolitik. In one case it didn’t help Russia, in the other case it did.)
Interesting. You strip out the “polarizing language” of the Times here, but you don’t do so when, in your lead story, Mikhail Khdorkovsky, your publisher’s client, says things like “sham tax auction.” That’s just fine, it seems.Your post is woefully lacking in basic information. Are you really that misinformed about Russia? The Kremlin has already booted out OSCE observers from the disputed border regions, so this action regarding the UN is now a major escalation, not some sudden issue that has just arisen.Your statement about withholding your views is simply weird, and your comments about “punting” are virtually unintelligible. But one thing is clear: While you speculate about being able to buy more time, you don’t speculate about Russia taking these actions for the purpose of clearing the field for a second military invasion, in which case Russia would have no intention of negotiating about anything, nor do you speculate about what would happen if the UN moved to impose sanctions on Russia backed up by NATO reaching out to Georgia. Quite possibly, this would change Russia’s outrageous behavior.What if, in short, Russia INVADES GEORGIA in the next four months? Pity you don’t care to consider that possibility, Georgians certainly are.If the editors of one of the world’s most powerful newspapers are calling the Kremlin destructive idiots, maybe Russians need to take a look at themselves. But you don’t speculate about that either, making your piece seem like a one-sided diatribe similar to what you seem to be complaining about.In short, hogwash.
Russophobe, I had no hand in the Khodorkovsky story.Regarding this UN action being considered a major escalation, I agree with you and nowhere have I intimated that this is a sudden issue that has just arisen. In fact, I consider the escalation obvious enough that I see no need to take up space rehashing the lead up to this, though I am certainly not against you reminding us.Regarding “punting” – I grant you that I am sometimes prone to colloquialisms as I find they can – sometimes – communicate more clearly and efficiently the idea in my head. The fact that you find this one “virtually unintelligible” tells me that I have fallen short of communicating that idea, so allow me a chance to clarify: I have found the United Nations to be very sluggish when it comes to taking decisive action on global issues of any sort. There are far too many examples of this observation to spend time spelling them out here and the reasons for this, in my opinion, are just as many. My point is that to the extent that anyone wanted to buy more time, this sluggishness actually could have been turned into an asset, as the Security Council could have done what it does best – delay the tough decisions until a later date.Regarding what I did not speculate on, withholding my views and one-sided diatribes – if you can point me to an editorial from an equally reputable news outlet from anywhere in the world that makes this more “two-sided”, by all means let’s see it. The minute I find one of those on my own, I will certainly post it. But realize that part of my intent here is to open the door for people such as you and the others contributing here to fill in the blanks that I leave, sometimes intentionally, sometimes not. And for that, I thank you for your contribution to this dialogue.