



AMSTERDAM & PARTNERS LLP

WHITE PAPER | APRIL 2021

# one minute to midnight

THE CAMEROON CRISIS



# CONTENTS

FOREWORD .....	3
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	5
II. THE CAMEROONIAN POLITICAL CRACKDOWN .....	9
a. The French interventionism in Cameroonian politics .....	9
b. CPDM and Single Party-Rule (1982-1992). .....	11
c. The Illusion of a Multi-Party System. ....	13
d. The rise of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (“CRM”) .....	15
III. DESCENT INTO AUTOCRACY AND INSECURITY .....	21
a. Amendment to the constitution in 2008 .....	21
b. The abusive “anti-terror” law and the Anglophone crisis. ....	22
c. Permanent repression against the opposition, journalists and citizens. ....	25
IV. 2019-2020: THE WRONGFUL JAILING OF PROFESSOR MAURICE KAMTO .....	29
a. Circumstances of his Arrest. ....	29
b. Professor Kamto’s release. ....	32
c. The long-expected protests of 22 September 2020. ....	37
V. CONCLUSION .....	47
ANNEX 1 .....	51



# FOREWORD

**T**his whitepaper will place in historical perspective today's crisis in governance in Cameroon brought about by the kleptocrat Paul Biya as well as France and other nations that have served as handmaidens of tyranny. As the second longest standing dictator in Africa, Paul Biya and the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement ("CPDM") party have created a regime that will stop at nothing to ensure that his position in power remains untouched. This comes at the expense of millions of Cameroonian citizens who are continuously being subjected to brutal and oppressive laws and are being killed and punished for exerting their basic human rights.

Despite the regime's concerted efforts to silence and demean its population, Professor Maurice Kamto and the Cameroon Renaissance Movement ("CRM") have emerged as the strongest opposition party and are consistently using their platform and mission to re-empower Cameroonians to use their

voices and fight for their rights in a time when it seems like all hope could be lost. As a result of his outspoken and direct disapproval against Biya and his regime, Maurice Kamto and the CRM have been the targets of numerous oppressive attempts to diminish any form of democracy from re-emerging within the country.

As we enter the thirty-ninth year of Paul Biya's presidency, Cameroonians cannot falter or give in, and the international community has no excuse but to take action.

It is time for this unelected junta to come to an end. Further, the African Union must assert leadership by establishing appropriate mechanisms to sanction dictators like Biya from causing further harm to their own peoples. Cameroon's suffering is far from alone at this tragic moment of African history.

*-Robert Amsterdam*



# I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cameroon is often described as “Africa in Miniature” for its geographical and human diversity. Cameroon’s diversity, which should be an asset, has become the source of one of the most neglected crises in the world. Cameroon is composed of two English-speaking and eight French-speaking regions. This double linguistic feature is a legacy of history: until the end of the First World War, the country was a German protectorate and subsequently administered under the United Nations Trusteeship by France and Great Britain. Understanding the country’s history is essential to better comprehend the situation and challenges currently being faced in Cameroon.

Cameroon’s history and politics are closely linked to France, which has had a significant impact on the imposition of single-party rule in the country. While Cameroon looks to new partners, France continues to maintain a strong influence over the political elite of the regime, to such an extent that it can be seen as interventionism. Ahmadou Ahidjo led the country from the independence of

its French administered part in 1960 and stayed in power until 1982, when he handed power over to Paul Biya, his constitutional heir who had been serving as Prime Minister. In addition to being Head of State, Paul Biya also took the reign of the country’s state party, the Cameroon National Union which he relabelled as Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) in 1985. Since 1960, Cameroonians have been subject to two leaders and were never given the right to choose their president. The imposition of a leader as well as an inadequate and a fallacious electoral system led to a complete political lockdown.

Cameroon remained under de-facto single-party rule until 1990 and then transitioned to a multi-party system following a deep political and economic crisis. However, the multi-party system has just been an orchestrated illusion and the president’s political manoeuvres reveal a well-defined strategy: appear to fulfil the conditions of international donors and satisfy the international community, and thereby show a desire for democracy



In power since 1982, President Paul Biya is the second-longest-ruling president in Africa, the longest-ruling non-royal leader in the world, and the oldest head-of-state in Africa.

and stability while diverting attention from the reality. Ultimately, Biya's regime has further repressed the opposition and tightened his grip on power, leading to the hyper centralization of political power. This pattern has firmly established itself over successive mandates of the president while the Anglophone crisis and the separatist movements amplified in parallel, resulting in serious human rights violations against the political opposition, human rights activists and journalists, atrocities committed against innocent Cameroonian citizens and other crimes against humanity. The conflict has left more than 3,000 people dead and 700,000 internally displaced. The Anglophone crisis has exposed flaws in Cameroon's political institutions: the

absence of a representative government and the urge to centralize power resulted in the exacerbation of differences between the Anglophone and Francophone regions and led to strong resentment from the Anglophone community towards the political establishment. The return to a federal system is crucial to solve the crisis.

The situation took a new turn in 2019 with the imprisonment of Professor Maurice Kamto, leader of the opposition and Chair of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (CRM). The circumstances of his arrest and imprisonment demonstrate the unprecedented repression against political opposition. The deteriorating human rights situation in the

country, the worsening of the Anglo-phone crisis and shift of the regime towards an assumed totalitarianism led Maurice Kamto to call for peaceful protests to demand a consensual reform of the electoral system and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, it is no surprise that these protests were firmly suppressed by Biya's regime and ended once again in violence and disrespect of the rule of law and the most basic human rights. Over 500 peaceful protesters had been illegally arrested and to this day 124 of them remain arbitrarily detained.<sup>1</sup> Their release is of utmost priority and the repeated wrongdoings of the government deserve targeted sanctions imposed on all security forces and government officials involved. The recent US State Department Cameroon Human Rights Report highlights that a number of human rights issues remain under Biya's "strong presidency" such as torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, arbitrary arrests, political prisoners or detainees, politically motivated reprisal against individuals, serious problems with the independence of the judiciary, inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections, arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy,

among others.<sup>2</sup> These atrocities took place before the eyes of the international community, which continues to be silent.

Silence is becoming consent and this white paper aims to show how consent is no longer acceptable. This is a call to

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action, decrying the lack of governance structures in Africa that are responding to this urgent need and a call to support victims in Cameroon and throughout the continent. The African Union and the Commonwealth appear incapable of assisting or providing a voice to the people of Africa, while France remains complicit in its control over Francophone African countries. Learning from the Rwandan genocide, we urge the international community to scale up its engagement vis-à-vis the deepening slide of Cameroon into the abyss in order to find a sustainable way out of the multifaceted crisis the country faces and to give a last chance to democracy, the rule of law and the respect of fundamental human rights.



## II. THE CAMEROONIAN POLITICAL CRACKDOWN

### a. The French interventionism in Cameroonian politics

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**B**efore addressing the era of single-party rule in Cameroon, it is necessary to look back at the events preceding Mr. Paul Biya's accession to power. After World War I, the former German protectorate that was Cameroon was divided into two territories under French and British mandate. A trusteeship agreement between the United Nations ("UN") and the United Kingdom ("UK"), as well as an agreement between the UN and France<sup>3</sup> were formed in 1946. The first was terminated on 21 April 1961 while the latter was terminated on 13 March 1959.

In 1956, on the initiative of its Overseas Minister, Gaston Defferre, the French parliament passed a framework law on the evolution of the overseas territories. Officially, the law enabled administrative and political decentralization, as it instituted universal suffrage and a single electoral college<sup>4</sup> through which the voice

of every citizen counted. However, the law was highly criticized, and the elections stage-managed. Léopold Senghor, State Secretary to the French Council's President in Edgar Faure's government, expressed his doubts about the law that he considered "balkanizing".<sup>5</sup> The Defferre law concealed France's main goal which was to neutralize the influence of pro-independence movements by hand-picking and handing over power to political leaders who will remain loyal to France.<sup>6</sup>

The colonial authorities opted for Ahmadou Ahidjo, a 33-year-old former postman under the thumb of Paris. In Parallel, Ruben Um Nyobé, the leader of the pro-independence party Union of the Populations of Cameroon ("UPC"), understood the illusion of this promise of democratization and lobbied for the country's independence at the United

Nations. On behalf of the Cameroonians, he demanded the immediate reunification of the British and French Cameroon, the creation of a government council and an assembly with legislative powers, as well as a deadline for the granting of independence to the Cameroonian people. Um Nyobé was described as an incorruptible man who represented a threat to the French neo-colonial system. Pierre Messmer, French High Commissioner in Cameroon, excluded any negotiation with Ruben Um Nyobé and aimed at destroying the UPC by neutralizing its leader. A ruthless manhunt was led, in coordination with the Cameroonian armed forces, against Ruben Um Nyobé who ended up brutally killed and disfigured. The repression against the UPC and its supporters in Cameroon lasted for years and resulted in the death of thousands of citizens, with the assistance of France. History shows that the fight for single-party rule began before Cameroon's access to independence. Thanks to the support of the French government, Ahmadou Ahidjo had nothing to fear from the opposition.

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**FRANCE RANKS AS A TOP FOREIGN INVESTOR IN THE COUNTRY WITH COMPANIES WELL ESTABLISHED IN ALL THE KEY SECTORS IN CAMEROON: OIL, TRANSPORT, TELECOMS, CONSTRUCTION, BANKING, AMONG OTHERS.**

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On 1 January 1960, the francophone part of Cameroon was granted “independence” with Ahmadou Ahidjo becoming president in May 1960. The Federal Republic of Cameroon was born on 1 October 1961, uniting the Republic of Cameroon under French trusteeship and the Southern Cameroons, formerly under British trusteeship. Five years later, in 1966, Ahidjo transformed his party, Cameroonian Union (“CU”)<sup>7</sup> into the Cameroonian National Union (“CNU”), the entity which evolved into the current Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (“CPDM”).<sup>8</sup>

Initially, the statutes and regulations established the CU as a party of the masses<sup>9</sup> that intended to develop a national conscience when in reality, it gradually suppressed free political expression. Subsequently, the CNU claimed to be a unified party respecting the diversity of the country. However, in 1972, a referendum put an end to federalism and led to the creation of the United Republic of Cameroon.<sup>10</sup>

In April 1975, Ahmadou Ahidjo began a new four-year presidential term. In June of the same year, a constitutional referendum approved the creation of the Prime Minister’s position, which was entrusted to Paul Biya. In April 1980, Ahmadou Ahidjo offered himself a fifth term which ended prematurely due to “health reasons”. President Ahidjo resigned, and Paul Biya succeeded him on 6 November 1982, a date that represents the start of a 39-year repressive reign

– seven terms – at the head of the country. Only Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, Equatoguinean President, surpasses him with 41 consecutive years in power.<sup>11</sup>

Throughout his presidency, Paul Biya’s regime has maintained very close ties with France, which provides weapons and – together with the Israeli private military and security companies – has been training the Cameroonian security forces. France ranks as a top foreign investor in the country with companies well established in all the key sectors in Cameroon: oil, transport, telecoms, construction, banking, among others.<sup>12</sup> The close relationship between the two countries resulted in a new cooperation agreement signed on 21 February 1974 in Yaoundé.<sup>13</sup> The agreement has been reviewed in subsequent decades, including in 2011 under the auspices of Nicolas Sarkozy when a renewed defence cooperation agreement was signed.<sup>14</sup>

Under the presidency of Emmanuel Macron, the impression was given that France’s policy was taking a different direction. President Macron has condemned the lack of political will to find a resolution to the anglophone crisis. However, no visible action has been taken to halt the atrocities committed against civilians. The influence of France remains strong in the country, notably through French companies that are well established in Cameroon. The ports are

strategic for the French military which uses them to send weapons and supplies to Chad<sup>15</sup> where the military operation for the Sahel, *Barkhane*, is based. France has chosen to favour defence and economic interests over democracy and respect of fundamental human rights. As the country failed to support civil society, France is clinging to so-called stability and is backing the regime in place to satisfy its interests.

A researcher specialising in topics related to elections and power in Cameroon, Marie Emmanuelle Pommerolle, wrote in reaction to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ “wishes for success” to Paul Biya following his “re-election” in 2018:

*France’s African policy may modernise, but the history of France in Central Africa, and in Cameroon in particular, continues to haunt relations between these two countries and their citizens. The repression of the nationalist movement – the memory of which has never been achieved –, support for the regime when it was threatened by the opposition in 1992, silence in the face of various episodes of repression (in 2008 for example, but also vis-à-vis the English-speaking leaders locked up for ten months without having seen their lawyers) attest to many Cameroonians the never-denied support of France for a regime now hated by many.<sup>16</sup>*

## **b. CPDM and Single Party-Rule (1982-1992)**

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In May 1983, Paul Biya claimed a coup attempt was fomented by Ahmadou Ahidjo's inner circle.<sup>17</sup> This coup attempt was followed by two other attempts in the same year. The former president was then forced into exile and was sentenced to death in absentia in 1984.

In June 1985, on the occasion of the Bamenda Congress, the NUC officials discussed giving a new impetus to the party. They decided to rebrand the party into the CPDM, which remains the ruling party to this day. The party led internal reforms that resulted in the reorganization of the party and the appointment of new figures. However, attempts to reform the system were recurrently undermined and failed to put an end to the tradition of centralization and autocracy.<sup>18</sup>

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**THESE DEVELOPMENTS REVEAL A SYSTEMATIC PATTERN USED BY MR. BIYA: GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF ENGAGING IN DIALOGUE WITH THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN ORDER TO APPEAR TO MEET THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.**

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On 24 April 1988, Paul Biya was "re-elected" for a second mandate. In 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall generated a wave of opposition and civil society movements in Africa. The lawyer Yondo Black created a new political party in 1990; however, the new party

was considered illegal by the regime, despite being permitted under the constitution.<sup>19</sup> Former members of the UPC gathered to lead a pro-democracy movement but the regime extinguished it by organizing protests against a multiparty system in April 1990, which was described by the government as a "manoeuvre of diversion, contamination and destabilization".<sup>20</sup>

In May 1990, a new political party emerged, the Social Democratic Front (SDF). Subsequently in December 1990, the multiparty system became law. The SDF suggested a national conference to discuss new political arrangements, however, Mr. Biya rejected the suggestion, fearing that such a conference would diminish presidential authority. Popular anger rose and seasoned journalists and activists such as Pius Njawé were arrested.<sup>21</sup>

Between April and June 1991, the opposition called for anti-government protests that resulted in riots in several regions of the country. Disobedience operations called "dead cities" took place across the country.<sup>22</sup> The strikes extended to August 1991 and dealt a severe blow to the country's economy. The opposition was mobilized and gained support through demonstrations that left dozens of people dead, falling victim to the security forces' repression.

In the face of these events, President Biya held a national tripartite conference with the participation of delegations

from the regime, the opposition, and civil society to negotiate a democratic transition.<sup>23</sup> He supported a multiparty system by suppressing the “counter-subversive” legislation put in place by his predecessor, thereby reinstating the freedom of association and the freedom of press. This conference had a positive impact on Biya’s popularity. Once the opposition compromised and the strike ended, Biya failed to implement the conclusions of the Tripartite Conference. The democratization process was non-existent in practice, electoral fraud remained pervasive, and the government has instrumentalized the

judiciary and the police against the opposition.<sup>24</sup> These developments reveal a systematic pattern used by Mr. Biya: give the impression of engaging in dialogue with the political opposition in order to appear to meet the conditions imposed by the international community and the demands of the opposition. However, once the pressure to reform subsides and the expectations of the donor community appear to have been met, Mr Biya reneges on all his commitments and reactivates the mechanisms of repression.<sup>25</sup>

### c. The Illusion of a Multi-Party System

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The first multiparty presidential elections held in 1992<sup>26</sup> resulted in Mr. Biya’s third term in office. The opposition, led by John Fru Ndi of the SDF, contested the results and accused the government of electoral fraud.<sup>27</sup> Although the validity of the results was also questioned by international observers, nothing stopped Paul Biya’s presidential inauguration.<sup>28</sup> The years 1990-1993, commonly referred to as the “years of fire”, saw the rise of a multi-party system and a civilian mobilization that generated institutional changes.<sup>29</sup> The CPDM had progressively partnered with different satellite “opposition” parties to gain the absolute majority in parliament, lost in 1992, and decided to form coalitions as a demonstration of the regime’s openness. In reality, the coalitions were used as a tool to weaken the opposition. The National Union for Democracy and Progress Party

(NUDP), the second largest opposition party at the time, benefited from this deal as members have been offered ministerial positions regularly<sup>30</sup> throughout Biya’s presidency.

This deal succeeded in weakening the opposition,<sup>31</sup> which suffered a decline of voters’ trust and translated into poor electoral results. In 1992, the NUDP won 68 seats<sup>32</sup>, 13 seats in 1997, and only 4 in 2007.<sup>33</sup> In parallel, the SDF boycotted the elections in 1992 and went from 43 seats in 1997 to 14 in 2007.<sup>34</sup> In 1992, 1997 and 2004, the ruling party granted itself the presidential seat, sarcastically alluding to the inability of the opposition to present a single candidate against Mr. Biya.<sup>35</sup>

The growing repression dissuaded citizen movements from demonstrating against the establishment. During the “years of

fire”, the students spotted in protests were denied the possibility of holding positions in the public administration and lawyers were punished with a suspension from taking the exam granting access to the profession.<sup>36</sup> Such threats prevented activists from speaking out against the government. Biya’s regime put in place different control mechanisms that on one hand neutralised international pressure while continuing its efforts at containing the opposition.

The multi-party system was stalled as the implementation of the constitution adopted in 1996 depended on laws signed by the president. Not only did the political system prevent progress from being made, but the legal system proved a significant impediment to the opposition at both the national and local levels.<sup>37</sup>

Under these circumstances, preparing for a post-Biya era proved challenging, and the opposition was given minimal room for manoeuvre.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, external interventions have not succeeded in changing the status quo. For example, in 2006, the Commonwealth enjoined Cameroon to create an independent election management body, Elections Cameroon (“**ELECAM**”). The legislation was passed in 2006 and was repealed that same year. In 2008, the body became operational when Mr. Biya designated ELECAM’s first 12 members.<sup>39</sup> However, the appointment of ELECAM members was not in line with the principle of impartiality as the majority of appointees were affiliated with the ruling CPDM party.<sup>40</sup>

The Commonwealth claims it has been providing assistance to what it describes as the “first independent election management body”<sup>41</sup> when in fact, its actions have supported Biya’s regime.

Major riots against rising fuel and food prices took place in February 2008, coinciding with a constitutional reform led by President Biya to extend his rule.<sup>42</sup> The riots officially left more than 100 people dead.<sup>43</sup> What started as a protest against economic measures turned into widespread anger at the government’s politics. Initially, the amendment to the constitution did not generate a strong reaction from the general public: “Although opposition deputies staged a walkout to protest the move, there was little immediate public outcry. The government had simultaneously enacted several measures to bring down the prices of basic necessities, dissipating some of the anger on that issue.”<sup>44</sup> Every reform initiative taken by the government is systematically followed by more restrictions and repression which enable President Biya to tighten his grip on power.

The lack of political change directly impacted the widening economic gap between the privileged few and the rest of the population. That lack of political change has also exacerbated the inter-community differences, notably between the French and Anglophone regions. Once the demonstrations appeared under control, the government-initiated consultations which sought to implement

institutional reforms demanded by civil society and the opposition. Following the presidential election of October 2011, the opposition and civil society were highly critical of the poll. The Electoral Code of 2012<sup>45</sup> as well as the establishment of the Senate in 2013 failed to change the regime's monopolization of power in place and the key institutions have remained in the stranglehold of Biya's regime:

*The electoral code grants the President of the Republic the sole right to convene the electorate and to determine the day of the elections. The absence of a two-round ballot, the division of electoral constituencies, the designation by the president of the members of the Supreme Court, responsible in particular for electoral dispute, as well as those of the electoral commission, Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), and the bias of the latter when registering candidates for elections of September 2013 give a clear advantage to the presidential camp.<sup>46</sup>*

In 2013, the members of ELECAM deliberately refused to consider the applications of CRM candidates who provided complete files, unlike CDPM candidates who sent incomplete files and continued to be registered.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, the financing system of political parties favours the presidential party. Funding from the state budget is available to contribute to the expenses of

the different legally recognized political parties of Cameroon. The funding is distributed into two tranches: (1) the first is distributed to the political parties proportionally to the number of seats in the National Assembly, (2) the second tranche is only provided to political parties obtaining at least 5% of the votes in at least one constituency in the last legislative election.<sup>48</sup> However, most of the candidates do not reach the 5% threshold, thus disadvantaging smaller political parties. For instance, in the presidential election of 2011, 23 candidates were in contention for the presidency and only two reached the 5% threshold: Paul Biya and John Fru Ndi.<sup>49</sup>

The rigging of the elections was widely denounced by the opposition. A high-ranking official of the presidential party told the *International Crisis Group* about the different means he used to rig the elections: he organized electricity shut-downs in voting stations and provided food for vote counters to distract them and stuff ballot boxes without them watching. Bribery, intimidation, and interdiction to publish polls<sup>50</sup> have also been employed in the past.

The elections of 2011 and 2013 have seen the emergence of new political parties, in particular the Cameroon Renaissance Movement of Maurice Kamto, created in 2012.

#### d. The rise of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (“CRM”)

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Professor Maurice Kamto was a legal practitioner and the Dean Emeritus of the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the University of Yaoundé II. In 2002, he gained the appreciation of Cameroonians, successfully litigating the Bakassi Peninsula case before the International Court of Justice.<sup>51</sup> Subsequently, Maurice Kamto’s experience as Deputy Minister of Justice (2004-2011) has allowed him to identify the shortfalls of the system in Cameroon and taught him how to better address the loopholes. The reflection around the changeover of power led Maurice Kamto to resign from Government and to launch a new political movement that aims to promote inclusiveness and representativeness – notable shortcomings of the ruling CDPM.. The CRM was founded in June 2012 and the speech delivered by Maurice Kamto on 29 September 2012, on the occasion of the first party conference,<sup>52</sup> was a founding step for launching the movement and a vision for Cameroon. The CRM does not seek to win power solely to dethrone the president. Instead, the party offers a credible alternative to the ruling party. The CRM has distinguished itself through a concrete program with tangible proposals based on five pillars:

- the republican pact;
- the education and youth pact;
- the productive pact;
- the strategic and patriotic pact with the diaspora; and
- the solidarity pact.<sup>53</sup>

The creation of the CRM reconstructed the political landscape in the country in general, and of the opposition in particular. The coalescing of opposition forces is an important strategy of the CRM, whose goal is to create a viable political alternative.. A renewal was needed after years marked by restrictions of political freedoms and deficiencies within the opposition itself. The CRM has not fallen into the trap of opportunism, unlike some other political parties that formed alliances with the ruling CDPM.

Shortly after its creation, in spite of the obstacles posed by the state machinery acting on behalf of the CPDM, the CRM took part in legislative elections in 2013 and entered the National Assembly with one elected member of parliament. The party made progress in terms of presence across the country and gained popular support for its detailed political platform. Furthermore, the party endeavours to resolve the generational divide at different levels, tours to meet young people have been organized and different youth forums<sup>54</sup> took place across the country not only to raise awareness but also to incite more young people to participate in politics. Moreover, in 2018, the party elected Mamadou Mota, the 38-year-old Vice-President of the party.

After the elections of 2013, the CRM worked on consolidating its presence across the country and within the diaspora. In 2015, Maurice Kamto

organized a political tour to meet Cameroonians in different countries and an “implementation committee” was created to expand the network.<sup>55</sup> The political demand is strong within the diaspora and the CRM understood its potential as it looked forward to the next presidential election in 2018. The priority was to mobilize and raise awareness, through various activities directly involving the citizens. For instance, in 2015, the CRM launched a national campaign titled “Save peace in Cameroon by demanding the reform of the electoral code for free, transparent and democratic elections” and members of the party distributed leaflets in the street to raise awareness among the public opinion.<sup>56</sup> However, the response of the gendarmes was disproportionate with Captain Ekani, head of security for the President of the National Assembly ordering his subalterns to “Molest them”. Invitations to public and national debate around the reform of the electoral system have been strongly repressed by Biya’s regime.<sup>57</sup>

Over the years, the party has established itself as the most dynamic and

inspiring political force in the national landscape. In April 2018, Maurice Kamto was chosen by the CRM to be its candidate for the presidential election scheduled for October 2018. The CRM has promoted the rise to power “by ballot only”<sup>58</sup> and insisted that presenting a single opposition candidate was the best way to compete with President Biya. Maurice Kamto undertook unprecedented initiatives such as the creation of a secretariat to coordinate the activities of the opposition.<sup>59</sup> However, despite the CRM’s efforts to mobilize the opposition and reach an agreement, the negotiations with other opposition figures were not all successful.<sup>60</sup>

In the presidential election of 2018, President Biya allegedly won with 71.28% of the votes and Maurice Kamto came second with 14.23%.<sup>61</sup> Competition between opposition parties is fuelled by the ruling party that uses the entire state machinery, including the judiciary as well as co-optation mechanisms and repression to undermine trusted and legitimate opposition candidates.



# III. DESCENT INTO AUTOCRACY AND INSECURITY

## a. Amendment to the constitution in 2008

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After being in power for twenty-six years, Mr. Biya initiated bill n. 819/PJL/AN<sup>62</sup> in 2008 which extended his powers and enabled himself to be re-elected without any restrictions. During that time, political tensions were high as the government pushed through constitutional reforms. Demonstrations took place in February 2008 in the suburb of Newtown, at which police fired tear gas and water cannons at hundreds of protesters, resulting in loss of life.<sup>63</sup> The next day, gunfire erupted near the airport and riots broke out throughout the city. According to a Cameroonian Minister of State, Marafa Hamidou Yaya, 40 people were killed in violent demonstrations that month.<sup>64</sup>

On 10 April 2008, the National Assembly, largely dominated by the presidential party, voted overwhelmingly in favour of amendments to the 1996 Constitution,

paving the way for a new seven-year term for Biya.<sup>65</sup> The previous constitution stated that the President shall be “eligible for re-election once”<sup>66</sup> whereas the new Constitution states:

*“Article 6 (2) (new) The President of the Republic shall be elected for a term of office of 7 (seven) years. He shall be eligible for re-election.”<sup>67</sup>*

Fifteen parliamentarians of the SDF left the room shortly before the vote, in protest against what they called a “constitutional coup”.<sup>68</sup>

Other amendments to the Constitution weakened the power of the National Assembly in favour of the head of state, and another granted immunity at the end of his mandate.<sup>69</sup> The amended Article 53 states:

*“(3) Acts committed by the President of the Republic in pursuance of Articles 5, 8, 9 and 10 above shall be covered by immunity and he shall not be accountable for them after the exercise of his functions.”<sup>70</sup>*

The 2008 amendments to the Constitution reveal a strong will of the head of state to reduce the powers of the legislature and appear to be an instrument to consolidate the hegemony of the ruling party.

## **b. The abusive “anti-terror” law and the Anglophone crisis**

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In December 2014, parliament adopted Bill n. 962/PJL/AN on the repression of acts of terrorism (“the anti-terror law”).<sup>71</sup> The bill called for the death penalty for a series of criminal acts ostensibly linked with terrorist activity. This included those committing acts deemed “act or threat of an act likely to cause death, endanger physical integrity, cause bodily or material damage, damage to natural resources, the environment or cultural heritage”, those found guilty of financing or laundering proceeds connected to “acts of terrorism”, and those found to be engaging in recruiting or training for terrorist activity.<sup>72</sup>

The bill was unanimously opposed by opposition parties, who viewed the legislation as an attempt to muzzle the opposition by threatening them with the death penalty.<sup>73</sup> The anti-terror law has also been highly criticized by policy makers, activists<sup>74</sup>, and the international community<sup>75</sup> who view the legislation as violating human rights and freedoms protected by the constitution.

The anti-terror law was officially enacted to counter the extremist group Boko Haram. The year 2014 was a turning

point in terms of the measures adopted to contain the threat posed by Boko Haram. In May 2014, the army started deploying troops in the North West region to combat the escalation of violence. The Anglophone crisis has left more than 3,000 people dead, 700,000 internally displaced and 40,000 refugees in neighbouring Nigeria.<sup>76</sup>

The expression of the Anglophone question took a different turn in November 2016 in the city of Bamenda in the North-West region, which has become the epicentre of the minority’s protests. Lawyers, teachers, and magistrates demonstrated against the marginalisation of the Anglophone community in all the fields of national life. The protests were violently repressed by the police and resulted in the deaths of civilians.<sup>77</sup> On 1 October 2017, on the anniversary of the unification of the country, the Anglophone separatists proclaimed their “independence”, and a radical branch of the Anglophone minority took up arms to attack security forces and symbols of the government and administration. Nonetheless, the government qualified the activities of the separatists as acts of terrorism and launched a military

crackdown. However, the military crackdown did not spare the innocent civilians, “there were reports that security force members tortured or otherwise abused citizens, including separatist fighters and political opponents”.<sup>78</sup> Using the pretext provided by the anti-terror law, the government forces destroyed civilian property including businesses, farms and private houses.<sup>79</sup> Hundreds have been arrested amidst the Anglophone crisis: “amongst persons detained relating to the crisis are persons arrested on suspicion of terrorism and detained indefinitely without being formally charged. The massive arrest and lengthy pre-trial detention without formal charges has raised questions on the arbitrary prosecution of terrorism”.<sup>80</sup>

While the fight against Boko Haram is justified, the anti-terror law has been used to suppress civil and political liberties and to eliminate political opponents.<sup>81</sup> According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, the anti-terror law has been used by authorities to arrest and threaten local journalists.<sup>82</sup> A number of journalists have been arrested under the law, including Radio France International broadcaster Ahmed Abba, who appeared before a military court, which is unconstitutional for civilians.<sup>83</sup> He faced harsh sentences, including a potential death penalty. Ahmed Abba served 876 days in detention in Cameroon for his criticism of the government. He was released from prison in Yaoundé, on 22 December 2017.<sup>84</sup>

The anti-terror law has been heavily criticized by international organizations, including Amnesty International, which denounced the legislation’s vague and broad definition of terrorism. It effectively opened the way for the authorities to treat anyone as a suspect, with devastating consequences.<sup>85</sup> It also includes disproportionate penalties and a provision that gives military courts jurisdiction over all terrorism cases<sup>86</sup>, allowing the

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**“WHOLE VILLAGES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND HUNDREDS OF MEN AND BOYS HAVE DISAPPEARED, LOADED INTO MILITARY TRUCKS, AND NEVER SEEN AGAIN.”**

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vague definition of terrorism to be used to criminalize peaceful political activities and infringe the rights to freedom of association and assembly.<sup>87</sup> Regarding the proportionality of sanctions, the law does not respect international standards. As reported by Reporters Without Borders, this is the case with journalists, for whom “defending terrorism” is punishable by 15 to 20 years in prison and/or a fine of 25 million to 50 million CFA francs (28,000 to 76,000 euros). Furthermore, Reporters Without Borders notes that the decision to give military courts exclusive jurisdiction over anti-terror cases should be the exception, not the rule. Moreover, the defence minister, who works under the direct authority of Mr. Biya at the Presidency of the Republic, has the power to

appoint and assign military judges, which raises questions about their independence and impartiality during trial.<sup>88</sup>

Amnesty International reported that 27-year-old student Fomusoh Ivo Feh was convicted by a military court to 10 years of prison because of a sarcastic text message about Boko Haram that was sent to one of his friends. In the message, he joked that getting a good job in Cameroon was so hard, it was easier to get into the armed group Boko Haram. His message was read by a teacher, and Ivo and two of his friends were swiftly arrested and charged with “trying to organize a rebellion against the state.”<sup>89</sup> Based on this law, more than 1,000 people have been accused of supporting Boko Haram, mostly based on very little evidence. Whole villages have been destroyed and hundreds of men and boys have disappeared, loaded into military trucks, and never seen again.<sup>90</sup>

On 10 September 2019, Mr. Biya hastily announced a plan to launch a national dialogue to resolve the Anglophone

crisis. However, the national dialogue was doomed to failure as the president’s goal has been to re-establish the pre-conflict status quo. To be able to reach a lasting and sustainable ceasefire agreement and prevent a civil war, the Cameroonian government has to “address both historical injustices and structural discrimination in everyday life.”<sup>91</sup> As long as the anti-terror law is used to violate human rights, and the crisis continues to be viewed as an issue involving teachers and lawyers upset with Francophone language policies, the national dialogue will be counterproductive, just like all the other failed initiatives that had taken place in the past.

By announcing the initiative to start a national dialogue, Mr Biya’s strategy was only to appear to show good will and divert the ever-growing international and domestic pressure to find a way out of the war. However, his moves have only increased anger and distrust among Cameroonians in general and the Anglophones in particular.

### **c. Permanent repression against the opposition, journalists and citizens**

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The anti-terror law has been used as a means of repression against the opposition, journalists and citizens, and has only reinforced the pre-existing climate of rampant oppression within Cameroon.

The government has been willing to use any means to silence the critics and

journalists. In January 2016, three journalists accused of failing to disclose their sources appeared before a military court. The case was the first of the kind as Baba Wame, Rodrigue Ndeutchoua Tongue and Félix Cyriaque Ebolé Bola were the first journalists charged for the crime of non-denunciation.<sup>92</sup> On 7 November

2020, Ms Mefo, head of English news at Equinoxe Television and Radio, was arrested on charges of “publishing and propagating information that infringes on the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cameroon”. In June 2020, the forced disappearance and death of a journalist, Samuel Ajiekah Abuwe (alias Wazizi), in military custody captured the world of journalism. The death of the English-speaking journalist was covered up for 10 months.<sup>93</sup> No autopsy was performed, and the authorities have not released any official statement concerning his death.

The period around the parliamentary and local elections of February 2020 saw a rise of violence in the country. Before the elections, armed separatists in the anglophone regions kidnapped over 100 people and the government security forces did not protect the civilians as their mandate requires them to, instead they committed further abuses against them.<sup>94</sup> Clashes between the armed separatists and government forces resulted in civilian casualties with people reportedly being killed deliberately. As no official monitoring mechanism exists, the authorities can commit exactions without being held accountable and

without official investigations on the deaths being carried out. Candidates, election officials and activists were also targeted.

We have listed only a few examples of the repression against the political opposition, journalists and civil society. An alarming number of human rights violations, abductions and killings are regularly reported on by NGOs. However, the international response remains very poor in the face of the atrocities happening in the country. The US responded to the Cameroonian government rights violations and abuses by suspending its access to the US market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).<sup>95</sup> The US has called for global pressure to be exerted on Biya’s regime over the increase of executions, unlawful detention and torture. Such pressure has proven insufficient to change the regime’s behaviour.

The year 2019 saw an alarming deterioration of the human rights situation in Cameroon, marked by the arrest of Maurice Kamto and hundreds of CRM supporters as a catalyst for the government’s repression.



# IV. 2019–2020: THE WRONGFUL JAILING OF PROFESSOR MAURICE KAMTO

## a. Circumstances of his Arrest

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On 28 January 2019, Professor Maurice Kamto was arrested in the economic capital of Douala along with 200 other opposition figures and members as well as supporters of the CRM.<sup>96</sup> This series of arrests occurred following a call by the CRM and its allies for country-wide protests organised around four main goals. Firstly, to say “No” to the hold-up of the presidential election of 7 October 2018; the civil war in the two Anglo-phone Regions of the country and the embezzlement of public funds around the aborted hosting by Cameroon in 2019 of the African Cup of Nations. Lastly, the protests were aimed at seeking the consensual change of the electoral system of Cameroon (electoral code and governance of the elections), which President Biya had unlawfully altered to further tighten his grip to power.<sup>97</sup>

In the weeks preceding his arrest, a case was submitted on behalf of Prof. Kamto to the Secretariat of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, against the Republic of Cameroon.<sup>98</sup> This claim was brought forward following multiple violations that were committed by the Cameroonian Government concerning the October 2018 presidential election. Paul Biya had been declared the winner of the election with 71 percent of the vote, while Prof. Kamto was said to have received 14 percent of the vote.<sup>99</sup> The election and its aftermath was marred by allegations of fraud and misconduct.<sup>100</sup>

The Ministry of Territorial Administration made campaign financing available to political parties only three days before the start of the election campaign,

violating Article 286(1) of the Electoral Code.<sup>101</sup> Additionally, the state refused a security escort to the various candidates with the exception of Mr. Biya. As a result, Prof. Kamto was unable to conduct his electoral campaign in the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon. Making matters worse, Prof. Kamto's ballots were out of stock<sup>102</sup> in some regions, and there were multiple irregularities involving the use of double voting by some voters.<sup>103</sup> After the election, a request<sup>104</sup> was submitted to the Constitutional Council on behalf of Prof. Kamto for the partial annulment of the results in certain regions on the grounds of widespread fraud.

Following his arrest on 28 January 2019, Prof. Kamto was charged before a military court at a late-night session in the capital of Yaoundé. The charges that were brought against him and the 200 others who were arrested included: insurrection, hostility against the homeland, criminal association, threats to public order, rebellion, group rebellion, and inciting insurrection.<sup>105</sup> Under Cameroonian law, it was evident that those arrested following peaceful protests risked life imprisonment, or even the death penalty.<sup>106</sup>

Four additional marches that were planned to take place the week of 28 January and the following week were prohibited for the "preservation of public order"<sup>107</sup> according to Mr. Jean-Claude Tsila, the government divisional officer in charge of the capital city. After protests

took place in Yaoundé and several other towns, the Communications Minister René Emmanuel Sadi further accused Prof. Kamto of trying to "destabilize" the government.<sup>108</sup>

In the months following Prof. Kamto's arrest, a series of statements were made by the international community regarding the escalating situation in Cameroon. In March 2019, a declaration was made on behalf of the European Union by Ms. Federica Mogherini who was the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as the Vice-President of the European Commission. Ms. Mogherini stated that "The arrest and continued detention of several leaders of an opposition party, including its leader, Maurice Kamto, and of a large number of protesters and sympathizers, and the instigation of disproportionate military trials against them, are exacerbating the political unrest in Cameroon. The rule of law requires a fair justice system and the release of detainees against whom hard evidence cannot be produced."<sup>109</sup> She further highlighted that the significant challenges facing the country could only be met by means of inclusive political dialogue and in a context in which fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are respected.

On 18 April 2019, the European Parliament adopted a resolution detailing the ongoing human rights abuses in Cameroon. The resolution deplored instances of torture, forced disappearances and

extrajudicial killings perpetrated by the security services and armed separatists, and called for the immediate release by the Cameroonian authorities of Prof. Maurice Kamto and all other detainees held on politically motivated charges. The resolution also condemned the use of excessive force against protesters and political opponents, called on the government of Cameroon to cease all harassment and intimidation of political activists and called on the government of Cameroon to convene all political stakeholders for a consensual review of the electoral system with the aim of ensuring a free, transparent, and credible electoral process.<sup>110</sup>

On 13 May 2019, statements were made on behalf of various countries and international bodies at the Arria-Formula Meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations in New York, convened to discuss the humanitarian crisis in Cameroon. Mr. João Vale de Almeida (Head of the Delegation of the European Union) expressed his concern about the rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation, stating that the EU would like to “raise attention on the need to provide a stronger regional and international response to the crisis in the North West and South West regions” and highlighted the fact that Cameroon was an important partner for the EU and that they stood “ready to work with the government and step up efforts to find lasting solutions.”<sup>111</sup>

At the same meeting, Ms. Cherith Norman Chalet, Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations,

expressed the desire of her country for “an increased awareness and visibility of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Cameroon, plus the immediate opening of humanitarian space and the provision of unhindered access for humanitarian personnel by parties to the conflict.”<sup>112</sup> She further called on the international community to continue the implementation of a coordinated and robust humanitarian response, and on the parties to the conflict to respect international humanitarian law by allowing aid workers to safely access people in need.

Mr. Jan Egeland, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council reported to the council that he had travelled to both the South-West and Far North regions of Cameroon where he met with communities that had been fleeing armed conflict and spoke with refugees and internally displaced families fleeing Boko Haram violence. He emphasized that the crisis in Cameroon is one of the world’s most neglected and that “The UN, the Secretariat, this Security Council, and all the agencies and programmes of this great family of organisations, need to do better in what we have all pledged; act to ensure conflict prevention, conflict resolution and bridge building before it is too late.”<sup>113</sup>

In August 2019, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report titled *Cameroon: Detainees Tortured*, detailing how Cameroonian authorities held over 100 detainees incommunicado and tortured many of them in a detention facility in Yaoundé from 23 July 2019 to 4 August

2019. The detainees had been transferred to the State Defence Secretariat in Yaoundé (SED) following riots that took place due to overcrowding, delays in cases, and dire living conditions. Several were being detained on suspicion of being involved with or supporting armed separatist groups from the English-speaking regions of Cameroon. A 29-year-old detainee from Kumba in the South-West Region detailed that they were being treated like animals and were beaten twice a day with wooden clubs and machetes whilst staying in dreadful hygienic conditions. Mr. Lewis Mudge, the Central African director at HRW, stated that “The security forces’ apparent belief that they are free to torture and otherwise abuse detainees is a direct consequence of the Cameroonian government

turning a blind eye to reports about the abuse – but the world is watching.”<sup>114</sup>

During the illegal detention of Prof. Kamto, numerous international bodies and global scientific entities condemned his incarceration and demanded his release. Amongst them were the Internal Law Commission; the *Institut de Droit international*; the World Congress of International Law Associations; the African Society of International Law and the American Society of International Law. Despite the combined efforts from various bodies over the years, the silence and lack of attention from the international media concerning the crisis in Cameroon remains deafening.

## **b. Professor Kamto’s release**

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On 4 October 2019, after nine months of arbitrary detention and in response to pressure from various local and international constituencies, Paul Biya ordered the release of Professor Maurice Kamto and other members and supporters of the CRM who had been arrested following the peaceful protests of 28 January 2019.<sup>115</sup> On 5 October 2019, Prof. Kamto and the other detainees were officially released. It is important to note however, that President Biya specifically ordered for “the discontinuance of proceedings pending before Military Tribunals”,<sup>116</sup> and did not therefore acquit Prof. Kamto or those arrested from the fictitious charges brought against them.

Under Cameroonian law, the charges can therefore be reactivated by the political authorities. Mr. Atanga Nji, the Minister of Territorial Administration, is known to have repeated this threat towards Prof. Kamto, highlighting Biya’s use of political pawns to further his dictatorial agenda.<sup>117</sup>

Prof. Kamto’s release came on the last day of Cameroon’s “Grand National Dialogue”, a series of nationwide discussions that took place from 30 September 2019, allegedly aimed at addressing the crisis in the country’s Anglophone regions. During the talks that concluded on 4 October, it was announced that Paul Biya had dropped the charges against 333

people arrested during the unrest in the North West and South West regions.<sup>118</sup> While the release of Prof. Kamto and the CRM supporters was long awaited and celebrated, the process that led to his release further highlighted the corruption present within the Biya regime. As Human Rights Watch observed: “The release of Kamto and other prisoners does not demonstrate that Cameroon is turning a new leaf because unlawful

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**IN REALITY, THE CRM’S  
CALL FOR AN ACTIVE BOYCOTT  
OF THE ELECTIONS WAS  
SUCCESSFUL. PARTICIPATION  
WAS SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN  
CLAIMED BY OFFICIAL FIGURES  
AND RESULTED IN THE LOWEST  
EVER VOTER TURNOUT IN THE  
HISTORY OF CAMEROON.**

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arrests continue...the government should demonstrate that meaningful change has come by ending unlawful arrests, incommunicado detention, and torture by respecting the rule of law.”<sup>119</sup>

On 10 November 2019, a presidential decree announced that parliamentary and municipal elections would take place on 9 February 2020. This would be the first time in seven years that such elections would be organized, as they had been postponed twice. Ahead of the local elections that were scheduled to take place in 2018, a decree signed by Paul Biya read, “The Mandate of

municipal councillors has been extended for a period of 12 months from October 15, 2018”, with no reason given for the delay.<sup>120</sup> Similarly, ahead of the local elections scheduled for 2019, Biya declared that “The mandate of municipal councillors elected on 30 September 2013 had been extended until 29 February 2020”, again with no reason cited for the delay.<sup>121</sup> The repeated postponement of elections without just cause only serves to demonstrate the complete lack of transparency and undemocratic nature of the Biya regime.

Following Paul Biya’s announcement, several leading opposition parties declared that they would boycott the elections scheduled for February 2020 due to the government’s failure to address the conflict in the Anglophone regions and to implement much-needed political reforms. Prof. Kamto specifically stated that “Holding elections in Cameroon without having restored peace in the North West and South West regions is sending a message that the people in these regions are not Cameroonians and, in so doing, enshrining the de facto partition of the country.”<sup>122</sup> He also urged all opposition political parties, civil society and religious groups to boycott the upcoming polls. The SDF, the leading opposition party in parliament also threatened to boycott the elections if peace and security did not return to the English-speaking regions of the country by February 2020.<sup>123</sup> The CRM actively campaigned for the boycott of the election.<sup>124</sup>

In January and February 2020, Prof. Kamto embarked on a campaign tour around Europe and North America, where he met with Cameroonian supporters and some foreign leaders. In Washington, he was received by Ambassador Tibor Nagy, the former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and other senior officers in the Executive branch of the US Government, leaders of major think tanks, and non-governmental organizations. On Capitol Hill, he was welcomed by Karen Bass- Chair of the Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives. In Brussels, Prof. Kamto met with Maria Arena, Member of the European Parliament and Chair of the Human Rights Subcommittee and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. In Washington DC, Ottawa, Brussels, and Paris, he was welcomed by hundreds of thousands of Cameroonians. Of particular significance was a rally in Paris which was attended by over 100,000 persons at Place de la République.

Despite the opposing remarks and amidst a deteriorating crisis in the country's Anglophone regions, the Cameroonian government held parliamentary and municipal elections on 9 February 2020. The elections were held with a heavy military presence, and as expected, the polls witnessed a low turnout of voters in the North West and South West regions.<sup>125</sup> While the CRM refused to field a single candidate, the SDF, which had previously

threatened to boycott the elections, ultimately participated.<sup>126</sup> Unsurprisingly, the Constitutional Council declared that Biya's CPDM party won 139 out of 167 declared seats on a "moderate" turnout of 46%, according to Clement Atangana, the council's president.<sup>127</sup>

In reality, the CRM's call for an active boycott of the elections was successful. Participation was significantly lower than claimed by official figures<sup>128</sup> and resulted in the lowest ever voter turnout in the history of Cameroon.<sup>129</sup> In February 2020, Human Rights Watch ("HRW") documented that armed separatists in Cameroon's Anglophone regions had kidnapped over 100 people, burned property and threatened voters ahead of the February elections. HRW further detailed that the separatists targeted those willing to participate in the legislative and municipal elections. The opposition SDF party was one of the targets, as the separatists accused them of failing to show solidarity with their cause. The separatists burned down at least three offices of the Cameroonian national election body, ELECAM, as well as a post office where electoral material was being stored. Rather than protecting their civilians from the attacks, HRW documented that government forces committed violations of their own, carrying out military operations in Bali (North West region), destroying over 50 homes and killing several citizens.<sup>130</sup> The inability of the Cameroonian government to protect and rather target their own citizens ahead of elections, paints a worrying picture.

On 14 February 2020, at least 23 civilians, including 15 children and 2 pregnant women were killed in Ngarbuh in the North West Region of Cameroon. The Cameroonian government initially denied any involvement in the killings and had blamed armed separatist groups for the attack. At a press conference at the headquarters of the CRM following the attack, Prof. Kamto expressed his regret that a National Day of Mourning had not been decreed in memory of the civilians killed, calling on the populations to express their solidarity with the families of the victims.<sup>131</sup> The CRM also released a statement noting that “The dictatorial regime [and] the supreme head of the security and defence forces are chiefly responsible for these crimes.”<sup>132</sup>

Following the attack, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres called on the government of Cameroon to conduct a thorough investigation into the incident and ensure those responsible are held accountable. The statement read, “The Secretary-General calls on armed actors to refrain from attacks against civilians and to respect international humanitarian and international human rights law. He reiterates the readiness of the United Nations to work with all stakeholders towards a political solution to the crisis in the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon through meaningful dialogue.”<sup>133</sup> Two months after the attack in April 2020, the Cameroonian government admitted that three members of its armed forces were involved in the attacks. This was revealed

in a statement read over the radio stating that three soldiers and a vigilante group stormed into a separatist base and killed five people before “discovering that three women and ten children were killed” in the firefight, and overcome with panic they tried to hide the incident by setting fires.<sup>134</sup> This tragic and painful event further showcases the lack of accountability on the part of the Cameroonian government. Judicial proceedings have reportedly been initiated before local courts against the alleged perpetrators, but expectations for justice remain low.<sup>135</sup>

At the annual Paris International Agricultural Show in February 2020, where he was questioned by a Cameroonian activist, France’s president Emmanuel Macron revealed that he had demanded that Paul Biya release Prof. Kamto from prison in 2019, specifying that he made a meeting with him conditional on the execution of that demand.<sup>136</sup> Additionally, when questioned about the Ngarbuh massacres, Macron said “I’m going to call President Biya next week and we’re going to put as much pressure as possible to bring an end to the situation.” This caused supporters of the regime and members of the opposition to clash over Macron’s statements, specifically regarding his ties to Paul Biya. Whatever discussions took place between President Macron and Paul Biya, the regime in Yaoundé recognised its involvement in the Ngarbuh massacres and decided to launch judicial proceedings<sup>137</sup> about



Maurice Kamto is one of the founders of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC). He was a member of the International Law Commission of the United Nations from 1999 to 2016.

the case after Macron's statement at the Paris International Agricultural Show.

On 7 September 2020, President Biya announced that the country's first regional elections would take place on 6 December 2020, including in the North West and South West regions of the country, amidst the neglected and deteriorating human rights crisis. This announcement came over two decades after the government first declared its intent to hold regional elections as part of a broader decentralization plan that they alleged would allow for significant autonomy in governing the country's diverse population. However, the overall sentiment from this announcement was

that it was too little too late. Following constitutional reforms in 1996 which were intended to quell the dissent from ethnic and linguistic groups that felt marginalised, the power to convene elections for the senate and regional councils was given solely to President Biya, who never called for such elections to take place. While passing such reforms at the outset of the Anglophone crisis may have addressed a few demands of the protestors, doing so in 2020 is clearly another effort by the government to present an image of themselves acknowledging the grievances of the Anglophone population, without engaging in any meaningful dialogue or negotiations with civil societies or separatist leaders.<sup>138</sup>

### c. The long-expected protests of 22 September 2020

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Following Paul Biya's announcement about the regional elections, on 24 August, Prof. Kamto called for peaceful protests to be held on 22 September 2020, to demand Paul Biya's resignation and the cancellation of the regional elections. In a statement released on 15 September, Prof. Kamto highlighted that "The marches calling for Paul Biya's resignation are not acts of insurrection, rebellion or hostility against the country, but the peaceful expression of people's exasperation with a regime that doesn't hear the cries of its population."<sup>139</sup> He further emphasised that the elections cannot be held "unless a resolution is found for the Anglophone crisis and a consensus is reached on the reform of the electoral code."<sup>140</sup> Ahead of the protests, he released a Code of the Peaceful Marcher in which the fundamental principles and guidelines of non-violent protests were conveyed to militants. Despite Prof. Kamto's emphasis on the peaceful nature of the protests, the Minister of Communication, René Emmanuel Sadi, alluded to the movement as an insurrection and the protests were prohibited by the authorities, who confirmed that severe punishments would be in store for any offenders. The US State Department "Cameroon 2020 Human Rights Report" also refers to Sadi's position saying "authorities typically cited security concerns as the basis for deciding to block assemblies" and adding that Sadi warned that illegal protests would be punished under the antiterror law.<sup>141</sup> The Minister

of Territorial Administration, Paul Atanga Nji, even went as far as to say that protesters may face life imprisonment.<sup>142</sup>

Professor Kamto and the CRM organised meetings with opposition figures as a means of mobilising as many people as possible ahead of the scheduled protests. Prof. Kamto spoke with several party leaders, including John Fru Ndi, leader of the SDF party, Edith Kah Walla from the Cameroon People's Party ("CPP") and Aboubakar Ousmane Mey from the *Alliance Nationale Camerounaise* ("ANC").<sup>143</sup> Following a series of consultations with political parties and civil society organizations, a first meeting was held at the CRM headquarters in Yaoundé on 17 September 2020, with some of the following groups in attendance: the Popular Action Party ("PAP"), the Revolutionary Democratic Front ("RDF"), the *Front de Solidarité Nationale* ("FDN") and the *Mouvement Démocratique de Conscience Nationale* ("MODECNA"). Following their meeting, these various forces of change for peace and democracy in Cameroon published a press release calling for a ceasefire in the North West and South West regions as well as a national dialogue which would seek deep reform of state and electoral institutions prior to any new elections. The press release also reiterated the call for peaceful protests on 22 September 2020, and should their demands for reform not be met, continued demonstrations until Mr Biya steps down and a peaceful transition of power is implemented.

On 19 September 2020, an arsenal of armed Cameroonian military stationed themselves in front of the residence of Prof. Kamto in Yaoundé, blocking all entrances to the house. An army tank was also stationed in front of the front gate, with artillery pointed towards Prof. Kamto's property. Prof. Kamto decried the actions of the authorities, accusing them of taking him hostage<sup>144</sup> ahead of scheduled mass protests, even preventing him and his family from leaving to obtain food and medicine.<sup>145</sup>

The following day, on 21 September 2020, hundreds of CRM supporters gathered outside Prof. Kamto's residence after hearing that his property was being held under siege by the Cameroonian authorities. Professor Alain Fogué, CRM Treasurer and Chief Strategist, was arrested after having been invited by the police to intervene in order to avoid the escalation of the situation provoked by the perpetration of acts being inflicted on a CRM supporter by a police officer. He was then subjected to acts of violence himself and was detained at the *Secrétariat d'Etat à la Défense* (SED).<sup>146</sup> Additionally, on the day of the protest, Olivier Bibou Nissack, Prof. Kamto's Adviser and Spokesperson, was visited by a police officer who informed him that he was not authorised to leave his residence, which had been surrounded by security forces. He was then driven by the same person ostensibly for a meeting organized by the General Delegate for National Security but was instead taken to the regional office of the Investigating Police and questioned in the absence of

his lawyers for several hours regarding his political opinions and activities as well as the political program and financing of the CRM. They have now both been charged with a series of fictitious claims including attempted revolution, rebellion and aggravated assembly.<sup>147</sup>

On 22 September 2020, military units were on alert in Cameroon ahead of the scheduled nationwide protests. Despite this, Cameroonians took to the streets across the country to peacefully demand the end to Paul Biya's 39 years of dictatorship. Cameroonian citizens converged at a major intersection across the country, shouting slogans such as "Enough Is Enough" and "Paul Biya Must Go". While the protests were intended to be peaceful, the Cameroonian government deployed police across the country to intimidate and target protesters. Police and gendarmes used tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets to disperse the protesters and camped out in trucks at major intersections, chasing some protesters across neighbourhoods and into their houses.<sup>148</sup> There is also video evidence of protesters being physically tortured by police officers standing with their knees on their necks and holding their arms back.<sup>149</sup> Arrested protesters were also being chastised and forced to sing songs praising and glorifying Paul Biya while sitting on the ground outside police stations. Some were arrested simply for reading newspapers and publications from opposition political parties<sup>150</sup> or having protest pamphlets in their bags. According to

the group of lawyers representing the peaceful protesters, over 500 individuals had been wrongfully arrested for exercising their right to free expression and peaceful protest.<sup>151</sup> Those arrested were detained in cramped, unsanitary conditions amidst a global pandemic.

Journalists were also victims of police brutality on 22 September. A cameraman from the popular Cameroonian channel Equinoxe TV had his arm twisted and neck stepped on before being arrested. A Radio France International reporter was beaten with a truncheon while covering the protests and taken to a police station. A reporter and cameraman from My Media Prime were also arrested.<sup>152</sup>

On 7 October 2020, Jean-Yves le Drian, the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, was questioned about the situation in Cameroon at the French National Assembly. One MP specifically asked him to clarify France's "position" on the "encerclement" by the Cameroonian police for over two weeks of Prof. Kamto's residence and the arrest of a hundred supporters of this party. Jean-Yves Le Drian replied that he "personally" knew Prof. Kamto, that he has already demanded his immediate release, specifically stating "...we have already expressed it publicly [France's position], I told the Cameroonian authorities that I would only go to Cameroon when Mr. Kamto was free and I have respected my commitment." Mr. Le Drian further invited the Cameroonian authorities to take the necessary opening gestures to

restore confidence on the domestic political scene, highlighting that the interest of Cameroonians is to promote dialogue between the various stakeholders of the regional elections in December, with a view to a transparent ballot and in a peaceful political climate.<sup>153</sup>

Following the events that took place on 22 September, a group of 14 United Nations independent Human Rights Experts released a statement calling for an end to the detention and intimidation of peaceful protesters. The independent experts demanded that Cameroon release Prof. Kamto and others arrested during country-wide peaceful demonstrations, to stop intimidating political activists, and that the government impartially investigate all human rights violations. The experts expressed that they were "extremely worried about mass arrests of peaceful protesters and political activists who express dissent," and "disturbed by the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators by the Cameroonian security forces", while also decrying credible reports of torture against those detained by the authorities as a violation of international human rights law.<sup>154</sup> "We have already communicated our concerns to the State, and we remind Cameroon that under international law every individual has the right to organise and participate in peaceful assemblies, associate with others, and take part in the conduct of public life. None of these acts is a crime, and Cameroon should celebrate and accept dissent, for a true democracy takes

into account public demands instead of suppressing them.”<sup>155</sup> As regional elections were scheduled to take place across the country on 6 December 2020, the experts called on Cameroonian authorities to take all necessary measures to ensure an environment conducive to peaceful and transparent elections.

On 24 October 2020, at least eight children were killed, and a dozen wounded after attackers stormed a school in the city of Kumba, in the South West region of Cameroon. As with the Ngarbuh massacre, there was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack, with the government blaming the separatists, while claiming that the school did not have military protection because it was not authorized to operate as an academic institution. Matthias Z. Naab, the UN’s resident humanitarian coordinator in Cameroon expressed his shock and outrage at the killing of innocent school children. The African Union Commission Chair, Moussa Faki Mahamat, said “There are no words of grief nor condemnation strong enough to articulate my full horror at the brutal attack targeting primary school children ... as they sat learning in their classroom.”<sup>156</sup> Following the tragic school attack, Prof. Kamto expressed his horror and grief, condemning the acts and calling for a political solution to bring peace to the North West and South West Regions.<sup>157</sup> Prof Kamto also called for a national day of mourning.

On 10 November 2020, the military attacked over 300 lawyers in Douala

who were demonstrating in show of solidarity for two colleagues who were prosecuted and detained under trumped up charges of contempt of a magistrate and attempted corruption. The protesting lawyers applied for bail for their detained colleagues, but the judge adjourned the decision. When the lawyers questioned the judge’s decision, the police and military fired live rounds and tear gas to disperse the lawyers, leading to serious injuries. Some lawyers present were also detained and fined.<sup>158</sup>

The incident that took place in Douala is just a culmination of several isolated violations of lawyers’ rights. On 27 October 2020, Barrister Owono Mbarga Cosmas, President of the Cameroon Union of Young Lawyers, was severely beaten up by police officers after questioning why he was denied entry to a police station where he was acting on behalf of a client.<sup>159</sup> Numerous other incidents have been reported in which lawyers have been denied access to their clients or have been forced to wait hours before being permitted to see them in detention, including the lawyer of Pascal Zamboue, a CRM party official who was kidnapped by unknown individuals and then detained in a notorious military prison.<sup>160</sup>

On 6 December 2020, Cameroon held its first regional elections to appoint councils in the country’s 10 regions. President Biya reportedly hoped the vote would appease the criticism over his neglect of the four-year separatist insurgency.

However, opponents say the vote only offers a semblance of regional autonomy, and observers dismissed the effort as doomed to failure.<sup>161</sup> While there are reports of at least one person being killed and several others injured on election day by separatist insurgents, the Minister of Territorial Administration told journalists the vote took place with “calm, serenity and transparency.”<sup>162</sup> As expected, on 9 December it was announced that Paul Biya’s CPDM party won in 9 of the 10 regions.<sup>163</sup> Prof. Kamto released a statement the same day, stating that “the conduct of these regional ‘elections’ has also shown that, despite its incantations, the regime remains incapable of, or little concerned with, ensuring the security of Cameroonian citizens” while demanding the release of political prisoners.<sup>164</sup>

Following the regional elections, on 8 December the security forces vacated the immediate surroundings of Prof.

Kamto’s residence, with no form of notice or explanation. Meanwhile, an active infrared camera next to the wall fence of his residence is invasively monitoring his every move. On multiple instances during his house arrest, delegations of CRM members, activists, and supporters tried unsuccessfully to visit Prof Kamto. Following one of those attempts, at least 20 women were arrested and detained.<sup>165</sup> Hundreds of individuals who were arrested in connection to the peaceful protests of September 22 (including key CRM members Alain Fogué and Bibou Nissack) are still being unlawfully detained, with evidence of them being tortured and blackmailed into signing documents charging them with fictitious claims.<sup>166</sup>

Paul Biya is rarely if ever heard or seen publicly. For a second year running, Cameroon has topped the list of the Norwegian Refugee Council’s most neglected crisis on the planet.<sup>167</sup>



## V. CONCLUSION

Paul Biya's 39-year reign has been marked by increasing repression, authoritarianism, and despotism. The Anglophone crisis has come to exacerbate the dictatorial nature of Mr Biya's absolute and arbitrary political regime. The regime has adopted a well-oiled strategy of giving the illusion of reform in order to appease Western countries, with millions of dollars of public money spent in public relations and lobbying activities in the West either directly or through private concerns benefiting from business facilities offered by the Cameroonian government. The "clientelist" practices of Mr Biya and his government have had a significant impact on the security and the economy of the country. The increased marginalisation of the people is illustrated by the fate of the Anglophone community, the economic regression of most regions of the country as well as the continuing attempts to eliminate any form of opposition to Mr Biya's rule, destroying the prospect of political reform in the process.

The continued crackdown on the opposition, journalists, human rights, and

civil society groups represents a serious threat not only to peace in Cameroon, but also a significant threat to stability in the region. The army's brutality against innocent civilians, the deliberate attacks against lawyers and the arbitrary arrests of hundreds of citizens are only a few examples of consistent violations of the rule of law. Furthermore, the Anglophone crisis has claimed at least 3,000 lives, and has forced 700,000 people to flee their homes. Children are especially suffering from the conflict, with 860,000 of them out of school.<sup>168</sup> The situation calls for urgent action from the international community to resolve and put an end to the most neglected crisis in the world.

The European Commission must ensure the implementation of the resolution adopted by the European Parliament in 2019. The European Union must also adopt a new resolution that takes into account the developments that occurred since a resolution was passed in April 2019.<sup>169</sup> The new resolution must call for sanctions under the new EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime,

targeting all individuals and organisations involved in the violation of fundamental rights and undermining the democratic process. Similar action from the US government is also necessary. The latest resolution<sup>170</sup> of the US Senate must be converted into law for further action to be taken by the executive branch under Biden's administration. While the EU and the US have been vocal about the situation in Cameroon, France has disappointingly not followed suit.

France has an important role to play given the close ties that have been built between the two countries economically and militarily. While France's diplomatic pressure contributed to the release of Maurice Kamto in 2019, it should be more consistent and vocal in pressuring and denouncing the Cameroonian authorities on the wider human rights situation in the country. For instance, President Macron commissioned a report to evaluate France's role in the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda. The report, put together by 15 historians with significant access to French government archives, concluded France has an "overwhelming" responsibility for Rwanda Genocide.<sup>171</sup> President Macron must commission such a report to investigate France's involvement in the security and political crisis Cameroon is facing. With France due to chair the United Nations Security Council in July 2021, it should take advantage of this opportunity to place Cameroon on the agenda, and push for immediate international dialogue and change within the country.

Strong action led by Western countries could have a positive impact on the way the African Union as well as the UN, address the security and human rights issues in Cameroon. Pressure on Mr Biya and his entourage should be significantly scaled up in order to establish a ceasefire and open an inclusive political dialogue about the Anglophone crisis, and to push for reforms in the country's political system to allow Cameroonians to elect their leaders through a fair and democratic process.

The AU, the UN Secretary General as well as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have failed to take the expected measures and initiatives to resolve the crisis in Cameroon. The UN Security Council informally discussed the situation in Cameroon for the first time in May 2019, even though the conflict erupted in 2016. The AU has remained largely silent on the matter and needs to coordinate efforts with the UN in addressing the humanitarian crisis, with the first crucial step being a timely response by the African Union Commission on Human and People's Rights to the various complaints of human rights abuses in the country. The Commonwealth, of which Cameroon has been a member of since 1995, has also failed to take concrete steps condemning the Cameroonian government's conduct, which clearly violates multiple articles of the Commonwealth Charter which enshrines the liberty to participate in democratic processes, and to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.<sup>172</sup>

Mr Kamto met with the Chairman of the African Union Commission and the Secretaries-General of the Commonwealth of Nations and La Francophonie in November 2019<sup>173</sup>, however the institutions didn't follow up and the situation only got worse. Furthermore, the Bretton Woods institutions should walk their talk by sanctioning Cameroon for the systematic and gross violations of fundamental human rights by discontinuing the release of funds to the corrupt regime in place.

As the people of Cameroon continue to fight for their rights to be heard and respected, the concerted effort of the

international community and global media should play a pivotal role in echoing their voices and shining a light on a crisis that has been neglected for far too long. Remaining silent in the wake of such horrendous events would make one complicit in the deaths of innocent people. Cameroon is emblematic of the crisis of African governance. The African Union must play a greater role in sanctioning authoritarian leaders like Biya to prevent conflicts from forcing people to flee their homes. The more the international community continues to turn a blind eye to the situation in Cameroon, the more the world risks waking up to a silent genocide.



# ANNEX 1

File updated on 6 April 2021 of militants and supporters of the CRM in detention in prisons in Cameroon

**MARCHES PACIFIQUES DU 22 SEPTEMBRE 2020**

*Fichier mis à jour le 06 avril 2021  
des militants et sympathisants du MRC  
en détention dans les prisons du Cameroun*

ORDRE	IDENTITE	LIEU DE DETENTION
1.	ASSOMO Thérèse	Prison Centrale de MFOU
2.	BAKAM FOALEM Gabriel	Prison Centrale de BAFOUSSAM
3.	BAMOU Jean Evalis	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
4.	BGAMENI NGALANI François	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
5.	CHEMBE Boris Stanislas	Prison Centrale de YOKO
6.	CHIEDJO Charlie Aimé	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
7.	COUBISS NGUEMBOU Saint Michel	Prison Centrale de YOKO
8.	DJEUKAM Arnold	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
9.	DJONDE Sidoine Béatrice	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
10.	DJONTU Serge	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
11.	DJOUA DEMANOU Carlos	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
12.	DJOUFO Brice	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
13.	DJUME Xavier	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
14.	DZUGUEM Florimond	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
15.	FEUKOU Louis	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
16.	FEUTSEU NOUBONGO Gaston	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
17.	FOGUE TEDOM Alain	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
18.	FOKOU SIGNOU Innocent	Prison Centrale de YOKO
19.	FOSSO Maurice	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
20.	FOSSOUO Zacharie	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
21.	FOSSI Appolin	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
22.	FOUEYE Xavier	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
23.	FOUMOOU DJOUMESSE Steve Jordel	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
24.	FOUMOOU Garilas	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
25.	INTIFALIA OBEN	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
26.	JIOGO Roger	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
27.	KAGHO KANA Jacques	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
28.	KALECO Paul	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
29.	KAMALEU NGALEU Louis	Prison Centrale de



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		DOUALA
30.	KAMDOUM Carlos	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
31.	KAMNANG TCHINDA Cyrille	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
32.	KAMWA KAMDEM Antoine	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
33.	KENGNE NOUTEBI Constant	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
34.	KENGUE TSAGUE Clovis R.	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
35.	KENMOGNE Jean Bosco	Prison Centrale de BAFOUSSAM
36.	KENNE Jean Fernand	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
37.	KESSOUO MBEVO Alexis	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
38.	KETCHA Rodrigue	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
39.	KOPWA DJENKOU Patrick Donald	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
40.	KOUAM POUOMEGNE Serge	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
41.	KOUAMO Patrice	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
42.	KUATCHE Jean	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
43.	KUATE Guy Proguid	Prison Centrale de BAFOUSSAM
44.	LAH YU FEE ZEU KEMTCHOUANG	Prison Centrale de YOKO
45.	LATI TCHOFFO Joseph	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
46.	LONTCHI TCHIENO Harold	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
47.	LONTI Basile	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
48.	LONTSI NGOUOTOU Vitalice	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
49.	MAFFO DIFFO Alphonse	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
50.	MASSIMO Hortense	Prison Centrale de BAFOUSSAM
51.	MBAYO Eric	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
52.	MBE Evariste	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
53.	MBEH Gabriel	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
54.	MBESSE Célestin	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
55.	MUKAM TAMBA Célestin	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
56.	MELI MANFO Gislain	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
57.	MIRA AGOUNG	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
58.	MOMO Mathurin	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE



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	Emmanuel	
88.	SAAGUE Jean Remy	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
89.	SAKANG Cyrille	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
90.	SIBIAP MODJIE Pierre Omer	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
91.	SIMO Ulrich	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
92.	SOH Stéphane	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
93.	SOP TCHIEDJO Jules	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
94.	SOP TIAM Mathurin	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
95.	TAGNE Jean Singhor	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
96.	TAKAM Louis Bernard	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
97.	TALLA KAMTE Robert	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
98.	TAMBO KAMTE Anicet	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
99.	TAMKOU NGOU Phillipe Roger	Prison Centrale de BAFOUSSAM
100.	TAMOKOUE Charles	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
101.	TANANKENG Raoul	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
102.	TATCHEUMO KOUAM Adolphe	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
103.	TCHAKAM NEHAMANDJI	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
104.	TCHAKOUNTE Stevy Yannick	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
105.	TCHEUTCHOUA Jean Roger	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
106.	TCHOUDJA Olivier Douglas	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
107.	TCHUEM Clovis Mike	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
108.	TEFOBEAU Gérard Alain	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
109.	TELEH MENBOU	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
110.	TEMAPI KAMENI Roger	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
111.	TENANBOU John	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
112.	TIAYO KEMKA TSATEDEM Armel	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
113.	TSI CHIA Napoléon	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
114.	WAFO Eric	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
115.	WAMBA Bosco	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
116.	WAPPI Vignoly	Prison Centrale de DOUALA



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117.	WEMBEU NYA Landry	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
118.	WEUBASSI Pierre Raoul	Prison Centrale de YOKO
119.	WOKAM NGUEWA Narcisse	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
120.	ZAMBOUE Pascal	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
121.	ZANGUE Denis Ghislain	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
122.	ZANGUE DOUANLA Thierry	Prison Centrale de YAOUNDE
123.	ZEUGANG Degaulle	Prison Centrale de DOUALA
124.	ZEULEFACK Henri Donald	Prison Centrale de DOUALA

**BILAN :**

Ordre	CENTRE DE DETENTION	EFFECTIFS
01	PRISON CENTRALE DE YAOUNDE (KONDENGUI)	50
02	PRISON CENTRALE DE DOUALA (NEW BELL)	61
03	PRISON CENTRALE DE YOKO	07
04	PRISON CENTRALE BAFOUSSAM	05
05	PRISON CENTRALE DE MFOU	01
06	TOTAL	124

FAIT A YAOUNDE LE 06 AVRIL 2021

POUR LE COLLECTIF

Me Hippolyte B.T. MELI



Me Sother MENKEM



# ENDNOTES

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