It has become shorthand for journalists to describe Russia as “resurgent” and dramatically “more powerful” than it was in the year 2000. We generally accept this fact because of its impressive average economic growth of 6.4% over the past five years, swelling the GDP to $1.6 trillion. We also are led to this conclusion because of Russia’s increased foreign policy activism: how Moscow is working to build closer, independent relations with governments near and far, and wielding its UN Security Council veto with greater assertiveness to build a role of influence in global affairs. We see Russia’s muscle after natural gas cutoffs by Gazprom revealed their ability to choke Europe, and we’re reminded that this is the second largest oil producer in the world after every visit to the gas pump. Moscow has been very keen to project this image of power and renewed strength, but how much of a gap is there between economic and energy influence and hard military power? Judging by the recent incremental “tests” put against Russia’s policy preferences by the West (recognizing Kosovo, missile shield sites, and discussions of NATO enlargement), the Kremlin probably isn’t satisfied with the “respect” that it believes it deserves. Further complicating the metrics of Russia’s role as a new global power are the peak oil advocates, recently bolstered by comments made by Leonid Fedun, the vice-president of Lukoil, to the Financial Times. Russia, it seems, after years of increased state intervention in the oil sector, may be facing declining oil production – a frightening announcement which sent supply jitters across the trading floors and may cause some policymakers to reevaluate the dynamic of confrontation with Moscow.