Charles Krauthammer at the Washington Post is catching a lot of flak for his article today which argued that Obama’s reset diplomacy with Russia and the new agreements to cut nuclear stockpiles was somehow a gesture of capitulation, selling the farm, etc.  I personally find any pro-nuclear, pro-weapons arguments a little hard to swallow (the pro-nuke fellows do not sufficiently account for the threat of non-state actors getting their hands on these materials), but Krauthammer makes a very good point about the Kremlin’s success in creating linkage between offensive and defensive weaponry.

Leaving the predictable arguments aside for a moment, Krauthammer’s article is driven by a core question that has been coming up again and again and Obama as Medvedev whisked from Moscow to L’Aquila.  Is Washington wasting its time by trying to work with Russia?  Is the current leadership in Moscow really interested in improved relations, and despite what are logical and rational mutual interests, is there any real will?

Most of the time we prefer to believe them when the Kremlin says they want improved relations, but time, patience, and excuses are running out for self-sabotage. Today’s news doesn’t help much.  Just in case anybody thought the summitry was going a little too well, Medvedev concluded his affable week with Obama by resurrecting a threat to place Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad (as though the regular threats to bomb Warsaw weren’t enough).
 
Take a moment to recall the original embarrassingly timed and tactically miscalculated threat from November, 2008, way back when Obama had just won his historic election, with world leaders from Iran to Zimbabwe to Venezuela expressing (at minimum) cautious goodwill and congratulations that a new chapter might open in relations.  Then, like a lightning bolt struck into the middle of America’s short-lived euphoric picnic, came the Kaliningrad move.  The siloviki can be such party poopers.

Both then and now, the theories explaining such a confusing move are abundant.