In a probing and noteworthy article in the Atlantic today, Paul J Saunders considers the role of the elite in the possible transformation of the political landscape in Russia as we begin the year.  Over the past few months, there has been considerable coverage of popular unrest, of street-based protest movements, of the widening of anti-government forces to incorporate a newly politicized middle class.  As far as high political machinations go, analysis has centered around major figures; Putin, naturally, Medvedev, Kudrin, Surkov et al.  What is interesting about Saunders’ analysis is the way in which he dissects the upper, but not upmost, echelons of the elite and posits some ideas as to how they might react to the current trends.  Here is an extract:

Analytically, Russia’s elite is split along multiple cross-cutting lines–the lines between politics and business; the federal, regional and local levels; pro-government forces, the “approved” systemic opposition (who oppose Putin but currently operate within the rules he has established), and the nonsystemic opposition (who oppose Putin and the rules he has established); those inside the security services and those outside; and Putin’s senior political lieutenants, principal business dependents and everyone else.