Jaime Suchlicki, Director of the University of Miami’s Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, has a paper summarising the Russia-Venezuela-Cuba-China-Iran relationship entitled, “The Cuba-Venezuela Challenge to Hemispheric Security: Implications for the United States.”

Most of it will not come as news to regular readers of this blog, but I thought it worth reviewing principally because it aggregates in one place a timeline of certain undeniable facts that hold regardless of what one’s political orientation is, not to mention the recent $3.2 billion trade deal between Venezuela and Cuba, as well as Bret Stephen’s take on the Venezuela-Iran in the Wall Street Journal. 

With regard to Russia’s role, Suchlicki outlines the following:

In September of 2006, Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov visited Cuba and signed an economic aid pact providing Raúl Castro with $350 million in credits to upgrade Cuba’s armed forces, including the acquisition of Russian transportation equipment, air navigation systems, industrial goods for the energy sector and the financing of future Russian investments in Cuba. Fradkov explained that the credits did not imply the sale of specific Russian military equipment. “This means,” explained Fradkov, “that Cuba will pay Russia directly for military equipment.”