I wrote up this short blog post over at my Corporate Foreign Policy (CFP) website, and I thought it might be of interest to some readers over here. To learn about what CFP means, read this post or this post. The new blog is a work in progress, but I have big plans to build upon this subject area. In many ways, we have an ideal case study of corporate foreign policy in action with the TNK-BP situation, all unfolding before our eyes as the executives consider their options. The irony of BP’s difficulties with the Russian government is that this joint venture was specifically designed and structured to protect against government interference by partnering with local interests. The company is 50% owned by the Russian businesses Access/Renova Group and Alfa Group – personally controlled by the influential Mikhail Fridman and Viktor Vekselberg. The presence and political clout of these two men was thought to help protect BP from the state abuses suffered by other oil companies such as Yukos, but as Gazprom and Rosneft took over more and more majority stakes in critical energy production projects (such as the maneuver pulled against Royal Dutch Shell at Sakhalin-2), trouble began to brew.