In yesterday’s WSJ, Michael McFaul writes about Putin’s plan: “The weakening of these three political institutions follows a strategy of deinstitutionalization that Vladimir Putin has implemented since the very beginning of his presidency. State governors, the Duma and the Federation Council (the lower and upper houses of the Russian parliament), the prime minister and his cabinet, the Supreme Court, the media, political parties, and civil society are all much weaker and less independent today than they were eight years ago. The absence of real institutions other than the presidency creates a real dilemma for Mr. Putin today: Where does he go next? During the campaign, Mr. Putin made clear his intention to stay involved in Russian politics and called upon his supporters to demonstrate their trust in him as a means to guarantee his continued influence in Russian politics. But translating his personal electoral victory on Sunday into some institutionalized form of political power after he steps down as president next spring will be hard to do. As a result of Mr. Putin’s weakening of checks and balance on presidential power, the possible positions for him being discussed in Moscow — prime minister, speaker, chief justice of the Supreme Court, secretary of the Security Council, general secretary of United Russia — have almost no power compared to the Kremlin. In searching for a place to park his tremendous popular mandate, Mr. Putin looks now like the victim of his own earlier successes. Only a radical change of the constitution might create a new formal institutional role for Mr. Putin, even if that is exactly the kind of change he has adamantly opposed.”