September 8, 2008 By Robert Amsterdam

Disaggregating Russia

medved090808.jpgAs the West grapples with how to respond to the Georgian crisis, one policy most likely to yield results, as part of any strategy, is that of disaggregation. This means finding ways to punish those in Russia responsible for pushing the Kremlin into its current trajectory, while supporting those who have a contrary view of their country’s place and opportunities in the evolving world order. Believe it or not, there are many who believe that a strong and successful Russia is not mutually antagonistic to friendly, cooperative, and law abiding relations with the outside world (I count myself among them). The war in Georgia is wildly popular among Russians today, but this support is thin and precarious for the long run. Russian people will not long support an isolationist gamble when it begins to jeopardize their newly comfortable lifestyle, monthly bottom line, or relative perceived stability. What may seem like a political masterstroke this fall may become Putin’s Katrina, as evidenced by the slide in the markets, desperate efforts to shore up the rouble, and the catastrophic damage to the country’s image. More importantly, however, is that the approval or disapproval of the Russian people is virtually irrelevant in this governing model. This is not a country where any accountability exists or elections really matter; its leadership is one that manufactures public opinion rather than being responsive to it. With near total control over the press, the Kremlin will continue to determine poll results and have its own story told. But still we can learn from these expressed perspectives how the Kremlin hopes to get out of this crisis, and what levers may be available to disaggregate.