After the news that Russia has offered to purchase every cubic inch available of Libya’s natural gas (this follows upon a similar, less publicized offer to Azerbaijan), is it even possible to identify any difference between Gazprom and the future natural gas OPEC itself? Thanks to a long series of aggressive and innovative deals, agreements, and memorandums of understanding, the state-owned company has extended its grip everywhere from Central Asia to North Africa, Gulf of Guinea, and even the Americas in just the past few years. It is difficult to identify a natural gas supplier to Europe outside of Norway that the Russians haven’t made a move on. Efforts to make headway with a common European policy appear completely stalled, as have the unfocused efforts from Washington to preserve energy competition (it’s amazing in and of itself that the Americans seem more aware of the security implications than the Europeans). The cumulative effect of Moscow’s energy strategy has pushed prices higher, cornered many companies and governments into poison pill commitments, and dramatically extended the political influence of an authoritarian government. Just two weeks ago, when asked about the establishment of a gas OPEC, Russian Deputy Energy Minister Anatoly Yanovsky told delegates of the World Petroleum Conference: “We don’t want to speak about a cartel organisation that would set prices with gas quotas. Absolutely not.” (Vladimir Putin has said the exact opposite not long ago.) For once it seems apparent that the Russians are telling the truth this time about the cartel after years of flip flopping: they say they aren’t interesting in forming a gas OPEC because they are the gas OPEC.